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Evidence Based on Personal Knowledge

Posted: Tue Sep 30, 2014 12:07 am
by Administrator
Evidence Based on Personal Knowledge


Webster moves to strike paragraphs 15 and 16 of Pomperaug's Local Rule 56(a) Statement on the ground that they contain legal conclusions and are not statements of alleged fact. A motion to strike is appropriate if documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment are not made on the basis of personal knowledge or contain inadmissible hearsay or conclusory statements. Pokorne v. Gary, 281 F.Supp.2d 416, 418 (D.Conn.2003); Spector v. Experian Info. Sys., No. 3:01-CV-1955, 2004 WL 1242978, at *4 (D. Conn. June 2, 2004). “In ruling on a motion to strike, the court applies the Federal Rules of Evidence to determine whether evidence would be admissible at trial and thus whether a court can consider them in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Glynn v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., No. 3:02CV1802 (AVC), 2005 WL 2028698, at *1 (D.Conn. Aug. 23, 2005) (citing Raskin v. Wayatt Co., 125 F.3d 55, 66 (2d Cir.1997)). Legal conclusions offered by both lay and expert witnesses are inadmissible. See High v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 363 (2d Cir.1992); Media Sport & Arts s.r.l. and Fed'n Internationale de Basketball v. Kinney Shoe Corp., No. 95 CIV. 3901(PKL), 1999 WL 946354, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1999). In paragraphs 15 and 16 Pomperaug asserts that student records are subject to both the Family Educational Privacy Rights Act and the Connecticut General Statutes. These are legal conclusions, and as such they are hereby stricken. Accordingly, Webster's motion to strike paragraphs 15 and 16 of Pomperaug's Local Rule 56(a) Statement is GRANTED.

Webster v. Pomperaug Regional School Dist. 15
Slip Copy, 2007 WL 987539
March 30, 2007