[Administrator]

Baker v. Fair, Isaac & Co.,
Slip Copy, 2006 WL 2989026, D.Ariz., October 18, 2006 (No. CIV 03-0525 PHX RCB.)

ORDER


ROBERT C. BROOMFIELD, District Judge.


Introduction

*1 On August 30, 2006, the remaining defendants, Experian Information Solutions, Inc., and Consumerinfo.com, Inc., filed summary judgment motions. Instead of filing a response to that motion, on September 12, 2006, the day on which her response was due, plaintiff filed a “Motion to Enforce Privacy Rules and to Remove Credit Reports Filed by Defendant Experian[.]” Doc. 317. As will be more fully discussed below, the court granted that motion in part, and denied it in part. See Doc. 318.

On September 28, 2006, again, rather than filing a response to the summary judgment motions, plaintiff filed another motion. This time she is seeking three different types of relief: (1) a “protective order[;]” (2) sanctions; and (3) an extension of time in which to respond to defendants' motions for summary judgment. See Doc. 322.



Background

On September 15, 2006, this court ordered Experian to “redact the month and date of plaintiff's birth from exhibits 4 and 5 of the Hughes' Declaration (Doc. 316)[,]” which was filed as part of its summary judgment motion. Doc. 318 at 4-5. On September 21, 2006, not only did Experian comply with that order, but it went beyond the scope of that order. In addition to re-filing redacted exhibits, attorney Carlson reviewed all of the exhibits which were attached to the Hughes' Declaration which was filed in support of ConsumerInfo's summary judgment motion (doc. 315), as well as those which were attached to the Hughes' Declaration filed in support of Experian's summary judgment motion (doc. 316). See Doc. 325, Decl'n of Marc S. Carlson (Oct. 2, 2006) thereto at 8, ¶ 3. In so doing, Mr. Carlson discovered “four other instances where Plaintiff's date of birth appeared[,]” so he redacted those documents as well. See id. at 8, ¶ 4. He inadvertently overlooked the fact, however, that plaintiff's date of birth also appeared on exhibit 3 of the Hughes' Declaration in support of Experian's motion (doc. 316). Id. Thus upon re-filing, plaintiff's date of birth still appeared on that exhibit.

In examining the redacted filings, on September 24, 2006, plaintiff pro se noticed that her date of birth still appeared on that exhibit. Doc. 322 at 2. She also points out that “every single credit report” which is a part of those exhibits includes “the first 7 digits of her SSN [social security number] [.]” Id. Apparently student loan documents use the borrower's SSN as the loan identifier. Significantly, plaintiff did not identify which accounts are her student loans, and it is not clear on the face of the exhibits. That same day, plaintiff e-mailed attorney Carlson requesting that he redact her birth date and SSN from all previously filed exhibits. Id., exh. A thereto at 2.

Three days later, on September 27, 2006, attorney Carlson responded to plaintiff via e-mail, apologizing for the delay in responding, explaining that it was due to his absence from the office. Id., exh. A thereto at 1. In addition, Mr. Carlson advised plaintiff that he would “review the documents and redact [her][SSN] from any documents filed with the court.” Id. Significantly, attorney Carlson agreed to redact plaintiff's SSN even though he was not ordered by the court to do so.

*2 Upon review of the refiled, redacted exhibits, Mr. Carlson “realized” that an exhibit which was not the subject of the court's order still contained plaintiff's date of birth. Doc. 325, Carlson Decl'n thereto at 9, ¶ 7. Mr. Carlson avers, however, that he did not see plaintiff's SSN on any of the filed documents. Id. This is understandable given, as noted above, that on the face of the exhibits, it is not evident that plaintiff's SSN appears anywhere thereon.

Despite filing redacted versions of the contested exhibits (docs. 319 and 320), attorney Carlson discovered that the original versions (docs. 315 and 316) still appeared on the PACER website. See id., at 9, ¶ 8. So Mr. Carlson contacted the Clerk of the Court for the District of Arizona. Mr. Carlson “inquire[d] about having the docket corrected, [and] inform[ed] the Clerk that the Court had ordered a redaction of document number 316 ···, but that it still appeared on the PACER website.” Id. Carlson also advised the Clerk that he intended to “refile document number 320, the redacted version of Document number 316, with an additional redaction [ i.e. omission of plaintiff's date of birth].” Id.

The Clerk explained that “[d] ocument[s] ··· 316 and 320 had been sealed and ··· [Carlson] would have to refile a further redacted version of those documents.” Id. at 9, ¶ 9. When Carlson inquired as to whether document 315, “the un-redacted ConsumerInfo declaration[ ] could be removed[ ]” since it had been refiled as document 319 in its redacted form, the Clerk explained that it “could not ··· because the Court had not issued an order to redact that document.” Id. at 9, ¶ 10.



Discussion

Based upon the foregoing events, plaintiff is seeking an order requiring defendants to redact the following “personal data: (1) birth date[;] (2) driver ['] s license number[;] (3) social security number (ALL digits)[;] (4) home phone number[;] (5) all addresses[;][and] (6) all account numbers for OPEN accounts except for the Capital One and Target accounts[.]” Doc. 322 at 2-3. Plaintiff offers no legal basis for obtaining this broad scope of relief.

The court will address these requests seriatim.



I. “Protective Order”

Although styled as a motion for a “protective order,” much like her prior “Motion to Enforce Privacy Rules,” what plaintiff actually is seeking is the redaction of certain “personal identifying information and all account numbers for open accounts from the [defense] exhibits filed with the[ ] 8/30/06 Motions for Summary Judgment and subsequent amended filings.” Doc. 322 at 1.

Given attorney Carlson's actions with respect to redacting plaintiff's date of birth, this request is moot. Insofar as redaction of her driver's license and home telephone numbers is concerned, as the court has previously ruled, there is no basis for this redaction because this District's Electronic Case Filing Administrative Policies and Procedures Manual (“Manual”) “does not deem the same to be ‘personal identifiers' subject to redaction[ .]” See Doc. 318 at 3. Likewise, for the reasons set forth in its prior order the court will not require redaction of plaintiff's account numbers. See id. at 3-4. The court also declines to order redaction of plaintiff's home address because the Manual requires redaction of that information in “Criminal Cases Only.” Manual at § I(E)(1)(e). Obviously this is not a criminal case.

*3 Turning finally to the issue of redacting plaintiff's social security number, for the reasons set forth in its September 15, 2006, order, the court will not order redaction of same. See Doc. 318 at 4. The court recognizes that attorney Carlson has indicated a willingness to redact plaintiff's SSN “from any documents filed with the court.” See Doc. 322, exh. A thereto at 1. However, as already explained, because it is not readily apparent from the exhibits where her SSN appears, unless plaintiff provides such information to Mr. Carlson, obviously he cannot be expected to redact such information. To conclude, to the extent plaintiff is seeking a “protective order,” the court denies her motion.

···



II. Sanctions

Plaintiff is seeking sanctions against defense attorney Marc Carlson for “filing ‘redacted’ exhibits including [her] date of birth and the first 7 digits of her social security number[.]” Id . The court concludes that attorney Carlson did not engage in any sanctionable behavior. Indeed, not only did he fully comply with this court's September 15, 2006 order, but he took additional steps not required by that order in a good faith effort to address plaintiff's privacy concerns. Thus, the court denies plaintiff's motion insofar as she is seeking sanctions against Mr. Carlson.


III. Extension of Time

Lastly, plaintiff is seeking a 30 day extension of the time in which to respond to defendants' summary judgment motions, with the 30 days running “from the day when compliant redacted exhibits are filed and all exhibits containing personal data or account numbers for open accounts with the exception of the Capital One and Target accounts have been removed.” Doc. 322 at 1. Plaintiff claims that she needs an extension of time because rather than preparing her response, she “has been dealing with privacy issues[.]” Id. at 6. She further claims that an extension is necessary because she “depends on assistance from her readers.” Id.

Defendants respond that none of the foregoing proffered reasons for an extension of time provide “a reasonable justification for failing to file an opposition to the[ir] motions for summary judgment.” Doc. 325 at 4. The court agrees.

Although the court will grant plaintiff an extension of time in which to respond to defendants' summary judgment motions, it will not do so on the terms which plaintiff is requesting. Rather, plaintiff's response to defendants' summary judgment motions shall be filed on or before 5:00 p.m., November 1, 2006. Plaintiff is advised that a failure to file a timely response may result in the granting of defendants' motions for summary judgment.



Conclusion

IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff Christine Baker's “Motion for Protective Order, Sanctions and Extension of Time to Respond to the Experian Information Solutions and ConsumerInfo.Com Motions for Summary Judgment” (Doc. 322) is denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff Baker's response to the summary judgment motions previously filed by defendants Experian and ConsumerInfo.Com shall be filed on or before 5:00 p.m., November 1, 2006.

*4 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court for the District of Arizona seal document 315.

===============

10/18/2006 Docketing#327

ORDER denying 322 Motion for Extension of Time, Protective Order and for Sanctions FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff Baker's response to thesummary judgment motions previously filed by dfs Experianand ConsumerInfo.Com shall be filed on or before 5:00 p.m., 11/1/06 FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court for the Dist of AZ seal doc #315.. Signed by Judge Robert C Broomfield on 10/18/06. (MAP) (Entered: 10/18/2006)

===============
Instead of doing what the Judge ordered her to do, she filed this stupid motion:

11/06/2006 Docketing#328

MOTION for Reconsideration re 327 Order on Motion for Extension of Time,, Order on Motion for Protective Order,, Order on Motion for Sanctions, by Christine Baker. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit by Christine Baker# 2 Exhibit Table of Exhibits A - K# 3 Exhibit Exh F - e-mail re. SSN# 4 Exhibit Exh G - request for protective order to receive Experian documents# 5 Exhibit Exh H - California district court redaction rules# 6 Exhibit Exh I - reader assistance# 7 Exhibit Exh J - Opinion Sheehan v. Experian# 8 Exhibit Exh K - Judge Joan Lefkow's Journey)(Baker, Christine) (Entered: 11/06/2006)

===============

Mrs. Baker is the zealot who has frequently and outrageously attacked the consumer advocates and attorneys who own and operate this site. She has spewed malicious garbage from her web sites in Arizona. Once again, her cases about which she misrepresents the facts, her berating and maligning of Judges, lawyers and other professionals, and her general mean-spirited diatribe, can all be seen on her sites.

I will post more on this latest debacle she filed. It will be involuntarily dismissed shortly like her other cases. She must be waiting for a "sign" from her "readers."
_________________
David Szwak
Chairman, Consumer Protection Section, Louisiana State Bar Association
Bodenheimer, Jones & Szwak, LLC
416 Travis Street, Suite 1404
Mid South Tower
Shreveport, Louisiana 71101
318-424-1400
Fax 318-221-6555

[Administrator]

08/06/2003 28 ORDER by Judge Robert C. Broomfield pursuant to Stipulation [15-1] of the parites, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Professional Recovery Systems Inc be dismissed from this action with prejudice, each party to bear its own attorney's fees and costs ; party Professional Recover dismissed (cc: all counsel) (SAT) (Entered: 08/06/2003)

09/22/2003 37 ORDER by Judge Robert C. Broomfield granting motion for ruling (Summary Disposition) on Household Bank's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion to Compel Arbitration by dft Household [18-1]; denying as moot the motion to Dismiss as to dft Household by dft Household [12-1], denying as moot the motion to Compel Arbitration by dft Household [12-2] (cc: all counsel) (LAD) (Entered: 09/22/2003)


11/18/2003 75 ORDER by Judge Robert C. Broomfield that Plaintiff Christine Baker's Motion to Dismiss [70-1] came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable Robert C Broomfield, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the complaint as to Robert Gray aka Bobby Grantham is dismissed without prejudice (cc: all counsel) (SAT) (Entered: 11/18/2003)

01/28/2004 118 ORDER by Judge Robert C. Broomfield that Craig Smith's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Christine Baker's Complaint as to dft Craig Smith [30-1] is GRANTED; party Craig Smith dismissed; tlabel (cc: all counsel) (SAT) (Entered: 01/28/2004)

01/28/2004 119 ORDER by Judge Robert C. Broomfield that Defendants Motion to Dismiss on Behalf of dft Fair Isaac & Company, dft Thomas G Grudnowski, dft Barry Paperno, dft Thomas J Quinn by dft Fair Isaac & Company, dft Thomas G Grudnowski, dft Barry Paperno, dft Thomas J Quinn [63-1] is GRANTED; party Fair Isaac & Company dismissed, party Thomas G Grudnowski dismissed, party Barry Paperno dismissed, party Thomas J Quinn dismissed (cc: all counsel) (SAT) (Entered: 01/28/2004)

01/28/2004 120 ORDER by Judge Robert C. Broomfield that Pacific's Motion to Dismiss Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction by dft Pacific Bell [43-1] is GRANTED; party Pacific Bell dismissed , tlabel (cc: all counsel) (SAT) (Entered: 01/28/2004)

01/28/2004 121 ORDER by Judge Robert C. Broomfield granting Motion to Dismiss Defendant Providian Financial Corporation With Prejudice as to dft Providian by pla [109-1]; IT IS ORDERED dismissing this action as to dft Providian Financial Corporation with prejudice; party Providian dismissed; tlabel (cc: all counsel) (SAT) (Entered: 01/28/2004)

01/30/2004 126 ORDER by Judge Robert C. Broomfield that Consumerinfo's Motion to Dismiss Complaint of Plaintiff Christine Baker as to dft ConsumerInfo.com [23-1] is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. It is DENIED as to Consumerinfo's motion to dismiss Baker's claim under 15 USC 1681(e)e. It is GRANTED as to all other claims argued in this motion; FURTHER ORDERED that Baker's Motion for the court to Order Consumerinfo.com to stop selling incomplete and incorrect consumer disclosures and misleading and fraudulent credit scores [33-1] is DENIED (cc: all counsel) (SAT) (Entered: 01/30/2004)

02/24/2004 142 ORDER by Judge Robert C. Broomfield that Baker's Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal of Pacific Bell [130-1] is DENIED (cc: all counsel) (SAT) (Entered: 02/24/2004)

03/02/2004 145 ORDER by Judge Robert C. Broomfield granting Motion for Summary Disposition by dft Federal Reserve Bk R, dft James McAfee [124-1]; FURTHER ORDERED granting the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond's and Mr James McAfee, Esq's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint [98-1] and all causes of action contained therein are dismissed with prejudice against the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond and Mr James McAfee Esq. Each party to bear its own attorneys' fees and costs; party Federal Reserve Bk R dismissed, party James McAfee dismissed (cc: all counsel) (SAT) (Entered: 03/02/2004)

04/05/2004 152 MINUTE ENTRY before Judge Robert C. Broomfield. Crt Rptr: Vicki Reger. This is the time set for motion hearing. Plaintiff is not present. Joseph Udall is present for Defendant Capital One. The Court notes that the Judicial Assistant tried to reach Ms. Baker and was not able to reach her. IT IS ORDERED taking under advisement the motion to Dismiss as to dft Capital One by dft Capital One [92-1]. Later: At 12:45 Plaintiff contacted the Court's chambers (the hearing was set at 11:00 a.m.) and advised the Court that she had nothing further to say regarding the pending motion. [cc: RCB, all parties/counsel] [152-1] (SJF) (Entered: 04/05/2004)

04/07/2004 153 ORDER by Judge Robert C. Broomfield confirming the Order [145-1] dated 3/2/04 granting the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint as to dft Federal Reserve Bk R, dft James McAfee by dft Federal Reserve Bk R, dft James McAfee [98-1] and the Motion for Summary Disposition re Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint filed 12/15/03 by dft Federal Reserve Bk R, dft James McAfee [124-1] (cc: all counsel) (SAT) (Entered: 04/07/2004)

04/12/2004 154 ORDER by Judge Robert C. Broomfield that Capital One Bank's Motion to Dismiss as to dft Capital One [92-1] is GRANTED; party Capital One dismissed; FURTHER ORDERED that a hearing shall be held on 5/3/04 at 11:00 a.m., to permit Baker to show good cause for her failure to timely serve Capital One Financial Corporation (COFS) ; show cause hearing set for 11:00 5/3/04 (cc: all counsel) (SAT) (Entered: 04/12/2004)

05/04/2004 171 ORDER by Judge Robert C. Broomfield that Defendants' motion to dismiss the claims asserted against the FTC and FCC [101-1] is GRANTED; party FTC terminated, party FCC terminated (cc: all counsel) (SAT) (Entered: 05/04/2004)

05/04/2004 172 ORDER by Judge Robert C. Broomfield that Defendants' motion to dismiss Equifax and Tom Chapman [103-1] is GRANTED; terminating party Equifax Credit, terminating party Tom Chapman (cc: all counsel) (SAT) (Entered: 05/04/2004)

05/05/2004 174 ORDER by Judge Robert C. Broomfield that Compass Bank's Motion to Dismiss as to dft Compass Bank [38-1] is GRANTED; terminating party Compass Bank; FURTHER ORDERED that Baker's Motion to compel Compass Bank to answer her complaint [59-1] is DENIED AS MOOT; tlabels (cc: all counsel) (SAT) (Entered: 05/05/2004)

05/13/2004 179 ORDER by Judge Robert C. Broomfield that Plaintiff's purported "Motion to Amend" [85-1] is DENIED without prejudice (cc: all counsel) (SAT) (Entered: 05/13/2004)

07/13/2004 197 ORDER by Judge Robert C. Broomfield granting motion 12(b)(2) to Dismiss complaint [1-1] for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction by dft Harry Gambill [87-1], granting motion 12(b)(6) to Dismiss (party) for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief can be Granted and Answer Subject Thereto terminating dft Harry Gambill (cc: all counsel) (LAD) (Entered: 07/13/2004)

08/24/2004 202 ORDER by Judge Robert C. Broomfield granting motion to Dismiss as to dft Trans Union LLC, dft Harry Gambill by dft Trans Union LLC, dft Harry Gambill [176-1]; terminating party Trans Union LLC, party Harry Gambill (cc: all counsel) (CMM) (Entered: 08/24/2004)

09/01/2004 204 ORDER by Judge Robert C. Broomfield denying motion (Request) for Sanctions against dft Equifax and dft Compass Bank by pla [173-1], denying motion (Request) for Sanctions against American Credit Agencies by pla [177-2], denying motion (Request) for the American Credit Agencies Corporate Status and Disclosure of Corporate Officers by pla [177-1] (cc: all counsel) (former emp) (Entered: 09/01/2004)

12/13/2004 209 ORDER by Judge Robert C. Broomfield granting motion for summary judgment by dft American Credit Agcy, dft Tom Wells [192-1] terminating party Tom Wells, party American Credit Agcy , tlabels (cc: all counsel/9CCA) (REW) Modified on 12/13/2004 (Entered: 12/13/2004)

====

WAIT! SHE MADE MONEY: $3,000!! WOO-HOO~ T-MOBILE PAID TO GET RID OF HER~

02/22/2005 215 OFFER OF JUDGMENT (Notice of) filed by dft T-Mobile (KCS) (Entered: 02/25/2005)
02/22/2005 215 ACCEPTANCE (Notice of) by dft T-Mobile of offer of judgment offer [215-1]; lodged order in Chambers (KCS) (Entered: 02/25/2005)
02/22/2005 217 RETURNED MAIL addressed to: Stephen L. Mansell re order filed [214-1] marked "return for better address" (KCS) (Entered: 03/08/2005)
02/28/2005 216 JUDGMENT by Judge Robert C. Broomfield : re: judgment accepted) [215-1], re: judgment offer [215-1]; that Baker is awarded judgment against T-Mobile for a total sum (including all costs now accrued and any award of attorneys' fees to which Baker may be entitled) of $3,000. terminating party T-Mobile , tlables (cc: all counsel) (KCS) (Entered: 02/28/2005)

====

05/17/2006 286 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 237 Motion for Summary Judgment. It is denied as to Dft's request for attorney's fees. FURTHER ORDERED denying 248 Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint. Signed by Judge Robert C Broomfield on 05/16/06. (DNH ) (Entered: 05/17/2006)

====

COUNTLESS HOURS OF WASTED EFFORTS, WASTED JUDICIAL RESOURCES AND COUNTLESS DEFENDANTS NAMED AND THEN DISMISSED [INVOLUNTARILY] WHILE PLAINTIFF KEEPS NAMING MORE IN HER ZEAL.

TOTAL TAKE: $3,000
_________________
David Szwak
Chairman, Consumer Protection Section, Louisiana State Bar Association
Bodenheimer, Jones & Szwak, LLC
416 Travis Street, Suite 1404
Mid South Tower
Shreveport, Louisiana 71101
318-424-1400
Fax 318-221-6555

[Administrator]

4 BAKER, CHRISTINE azdce 3:2003cv00525 03/19/2003 890
Baker v. Fair Isaac & Company, et al
5 BAKER, CHRISTINE azdce 3:2003cv00525 03/19/2003 890
Baker v. Fair Isaac & Company, et al
6 BAKER, CHRISTINE azdce 3:2004cv01192 06/09/2004 890 08/30/2006
Baker v. Capital One Financia, et al
7 BAKER, CHRISTINE azdce 3:2004cv01192 06/09/2004 890 08/30/2006
Baker v. Capital One Financia, et al
8 BAKER, CHRISTINE azdce 3:2006cv02927 12/06/2006 890
Baker v. TransUnion, LLC et al
Appellate Cases

Name Court Case No. Filed NOS Closed
9 BAKER, CHRISTINE 09ca 04-16885 09/24/2004 3890 11/23/2004
BAKER vs. TRANS UNION LLC
10 BAKER, CHRISTINE 09ca 06-16849 10/05/2006 3890
BAKER vs. EQUIFAX INFO. SVC
_________________
David Szwak
Chairman, Consumer Protection Section, Louisiana State Bar Association
Bodenheimer, Jones & Szwak, LLC
416 Travis Street, Suite 1404
Mid South Tower
Shreveport, Louisiana 71101
318-424-1400
Fax 318-221-6555

[Administrator]

in #9, she filed an appeal from an unappealable order - appeal dismissed!

US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Case Summary
Court of Appeals Docket #: 04-16885 Filed: 9/24/04
Nsuit: 3890 Other statutory actions (Fed)
Baker v. Trans Union LLC, et al
Appeal from: District of Arizona (Phoenix)

Lower court information:
District: 0970-2 : CV-03-00525-RCB
presiding judge: Robert C. Broomfield, District Judge

9/24/04 DOCKETED CAUSE AND ENTERED APPEARANCE OF APLT IN PRO PER
AND COUNSEL FOR APLES. CADS SENT (Y/N): n. setting schedule
as follows: appellant's designation of RT is due 9/27/04;
appellee's designation of RT is due 10/7/04,, ; appellant
shall order transcript by 10/18/04; court reporter shall
file transcript in DC by 11/17/04, ; certificate of record
shall be filed by ; appellant's opening brief is due 1/3/05;
appellees' brief is due 2/2/05,, ; appellants' reply brief
is due 2/16/05; [04-16885] (kkw)

11/23/04 Order filed DISMISSED. A rev of the record demonstrates
that this ct lacks jurisdiction over this appl because the
orders challenged in the appeal are not final or
appealable. CITE. Consequently, this appl is dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction. ( Procedurally Terminated After Other
Judicial Action; Jurisdictional Defects. Diarmuid F.
O'SCANNLAIN, Edward LEAVY, M. M. McKEOWN ) [04-16885]
(gar)

12/6/04 Received certificate of record. [04-16885] (gar)

12/15/04 MANDATE ISSUED [04-16885] (gar)

12/17/04 Received copy of District Court order filed on 12/13/04:
defendants' mtn for summary judgment is granted. CASEFILE
[04-16885] (gar)
_________________
David Szwak
Chairman, Consumer Protection Section, Louisiana State Bar Association
Bodenheimer, Jones & Szwak, LLC
416 Travis Street, Suite 1404
Mid South Tower
Shreveport, Louisiana 71101
318-424-1400
Fax 318-221-6555

[Administrator]

here is #6 and #7 [PACER duplicated them on the listing] - defendants involuntarily dismissed and seeking sanctions against her

====

U.S. District Court
DISTRICT OF ARIZONA (Prescott Division)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:04-cv-01192-NVW

Baker v. Capital One Financia, et al
Assigned to: Judge Neil V Wake
Demand: $0
Case in other court: Ninth Circuit, 06-16849
Cause: 15:1681 Fair Credit Reporting Act
Date Filed: 06/09/2004
Date Terminated: 08/30/2006
Jury Demand: Plaintiff
Nature of Suit: 890 Other Statutory Actions
Jurisdiction: Federal Question
Plaintiff
Christine Baker represented by Christine Baker
HC 37
Box 2126
Meadview, AZ 86444
206-202-4653
Fax: 571-222-1000
Email: christine@bayhouse.com


V.

Defendant
Capital One Financial Corporation
TERMINATED: 12/10/2004 represented by Joseph Merrill Udall
Law Firm of Joseph M Udall PLC
18 E University Dr
Ste 201
Mesa, AZ 85201
(480)222-0398
TERMINATED: 12/10/2004
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Equifax Information Services, LLC
also known as
Equifax Credit Information Services represented by Lewis P Perling
Kilpatrick Stockton LLP
1100 Peachtree St
Ste 2800
Atlanta, GA 30309
404-815-6199
Fax: 404-541-3336
Email: lperling@kilpatrickstockton.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rodrick Joseph Coffey
Stinson Morrison Hecker LLP
1850 N Central Ave
Ste 2100
Phoenix, AZ 85004-4584
602-212-8572
Fax: 602-240-6925
Email: rcoffey@stinsonmoheck.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Retailers National Bank
TERMINATED: 04/13/2006 represented by Heidi McNeil Staudenmaier
Snell & Wilmer LLP
1 Arizona Ctr
400 E Van Buren
Phoenix, AZ 85004-0001
602-382-6000
Fax: 602-382-6070
Email: hstaudenmaier@swlaw.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jennifer Hadley Dioguardi
Snell & Wilmer LLP
1 Arizona Ctr
400 E Van Buren
Phoenix, AZ 85004
602-382-6371
Fax: 602-382-6070
Email: jdioguardi@swlaw.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Ameriquest Mortgage
TERMINATED: 10/26/2005 represented by Jeffrey Messing
Poli & Ball PLC
2999 N 44 St
Ste 500
Phoenix, AZ 85018-7252
602-808-1400
Fax: 602-840-4411
Email: messing@poliball.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Does
1-10

Defendant
Capital One Bank represented by Kathleen Ann Biesterveld
Salt River Project
1521 N Project Dr
PAB341
Phoenix, AZ 85072-0001
602-236-2242
Fax: 602-236-5952
Email: kabieste@srpnet.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Duffy Quigley
Quarles & Brady Streich Lang LLP
1 Renaissance Sq
2 N Central Ave
Phoenix, AZ 85004-2391
602-229-5200
Fax: 602-229-5690
Email: kquigley@quarles.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nicole Maroulakos Goodwin
Quarles & Brady Streich Lang LLP
2 N Central Ave
Phoenix, AZ 85004
602-229-5200
Fax: 602-229-5690
Email: ngoodwin@quarles.com
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Capital One Services
TERMINATED: 08/03/2005 represented by Kathleen Ann Biesterveld
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Duffy Quigley
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nicole Maroulakos Goodwin
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Capital One FSB
TERMINATED: 08/03/2005 represented by Kathleen Ann Biesterveld
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Duffy Quigley
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nicole Maroulakos Goodwin
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Panda Management Company, Inc.
TERMINATED: 11/17/2005

Defendant
Anthony Ferlanti
TERMINATED: 11/17/2005


Date Filed # Docket Text

06/09/2004 1 COMPLAINT filed. Considered for possible arbitration. (LSP) (Entered: 06/10/2004)

06/25/2004 2 Party agrees to mag judge jurisdiction (MAP) (Entered: 06/28/2004)
07/14/2004 3 WAIVER of Service of summons and complaint upon dft Retailers Natl Bank ; waiver sent on 6/22/04 (MAP) (Entered: 07/14/2004)

07/21/2004 4 WAIVER of Service of summons and complaint upon dft Ameriquest Mortgage ; waiver sent on 6/22/04 (MAP) (Entered: 07/26/2004)

08/19/2004 5 JOINT STIPULATION to extend time (thru 9/8/04) for Dft Retailers Natl Bank to answer complaint [1-1] by dft Retailers Natl Bank, pla Christine Baker [5-1] (MAP) (Entered: 08/23/2004)

08/20/2004 6 MOTION to dismiss as to dft Ameriquest Mortgage by dft Ameriquest Mortgage [6-1] (MAP) (Entered: 08/23/2004)

08/20/2004 7 Party elects assignment of case to district judge ; mag election form ddl satisfied 8/20/04 (MAP) (Entered: 08/23/2004)

08/23/2004 8 MINUTE ORDER that pursuant to Local Rule 1.2(e), a request has been received for a random reassignment of this case to a District Judge FURTHER ORDERED Case reassigned by random draw to Judge Neil V. Wake All future papers/pleadings should now list the following COMPLETE case number: CIV-04-1192-PCT-NVW (cc: all counsel/NVW/VAM) [8-2] (MAP) (Entered: 08/23/2004)

08/23/2004 9 (NOTICE OF FILING ORIGINAL) AFFIDAVIT of Carol Melber in support of motion to dismiss as to dft Ameriquest Mortgage by dft Ameriquest Mortgage [6-1] by dft Ameriquest Mortgage (MAP) (Entered: 08/24/2004)

08/24/2004 10 ORDER by Mag Judge Virginia A. Mathis granting stipulation to extend time (thru 9/8/04) for Dft Retailers Natl Bank to answer complaint [1-1] by dft Retailers Natl Bank, pla Christine Baker [5-1] (cc: all counsel) (MAP) (Entered: 08/24/2004)

09/02/2004 11 ANSWER to complaint referred [1-1] by dft Retailers Natl Bank (SAT) (Entered: 09/08/2004)

09/02/2004 12 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by dft Retailers Natl Bank (SAT) (Entered: 09/08/2004)

09/07/2004 14 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by dft Ameriquest Mortgage (DMT) (Entered: 09/15/2004)

09/08/2004 15 RESPONSE by pla to motion to dismiss as to dft Ameriquest Mortgage by dft Ameriquest Mortgage [6-1] (DMT) (Entered: 09/15/2004)

09/10/2004 13 REPLY by dft Ameriquest Mortgage to response to motion to dismiss as to dft Ameriquest Mortgage by dft Ameriquest Mortgage [6-1] (MAP) (Entered: 09/14/2004)

10/05/2004 16 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by dft Capital One Financia (DMT) (Entered: 10/07/2004)

10/05/2004 18 RETURN OF SERVICE EXECUTED summons/complaint upon Amy St Lawrence for dft Equifax Credit on 9/30/04 (MAP) (Entered: 10/07/2004)

10/05/2004 17 MOTION to dismiss complaint as to dft Capital One Financia by dft Capital One Financia [17-1] (originally docketed 10/7/04) (DMT) Modified on 11/10/2004 (Entered: 11/10/2004)

10/14/2004 19 RETURN OF SERVICE EXECUTED summons/complaint upon Tina L Rogers for dft Capital One Financia on 9/16/04 (MAP) (Entered: 10/15/2004)

10/19/2004 20 ANSWER to complaint [1-1] by dft Equifax Credit (MAP) (Entered: 10/19/2004)

10/19/2004 21 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by dft Equifax Credit (MAP) (Entered: 10/19/2004)

11/01/2004 22 RESPONSE by pla Christine Baker to motion to dismiss case by dft Capital One Financia [17-1] (KCS) (Entered: 11/04/2004)

11/01/2004 22 AFFIDAVIT of Christine Baker in support of response to motion [22-1] by pla Christine Baker (KCS) (Entered: 11/04/2004)

11/05/2004 23 REPLY by dft to response to motion to dismiss complaint as to dft Capital One Financia by dft Capital One Financia [17-1] (DMT) (Entered: 11/10/2004)

11/17/2004 24 ORDER by Judge Neil V. Wake granting motion to dismiss as to dft Ameriquest Mortgage by dft Ameriquest Mortgage for failure to state a claim [6-1]. Pla is granted leave until 12/10/04 within which to file an amended complaint attempting to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against dft Ameriquest. If pla does not timely comply, Court will thereafter and without further notice dismiss this action as against dft Ameriquest by final order (cc: all counsel) (DMT) (Entered: 11/17/2004)

11/17/2004 25 ORDER by Judge Neil V. Wake granting motion to dismiss complaint as to dft Capital One Financial by dft Capital One Financial [17-1] for lactk of personal jurisdiction and dft's alternative motion to dismiss is denied as moot. Pla is granted leave to file an amended complaint by 12/10/04 to substitute Capital One Bank as a dft in place of dft Capital One Financial Corp. If pla elects not to file amended complaint timely, Court will thereafter enter a jgm of dismissal as to dft Capital One Financial Corp which Court will certify as final (cc: all counsel) (DMT) (Entered: 11/17/2004)

12/10/2004 26 AMENDED COMPLAINT by pla Christine Baker ;; jury demand [1-1] terminating dft Capital One Financia;adding dft Capital One Bank, Capital One Services, Capital One FSB, Panda Management, Anthony Ferlanti (SRB) (Entered: 12/14/2004)

12/23/2004 27 CERTIFICATE of service by pla showing served by mail on 12/20/04 the first amended complaint on Atty for Ameriquest, Target Stores, Equifax (DMT) (Entered: 12/29/2004)

01/05/2005 28 MOTION to dismiss first amended complaint by dft Ameriquest Mortgage [28-1] (SRB) (Entered: 01/07/2005)

01/10/2005 29 STIPULATION to extend time to answer first amended complaint up to and including 2/7/05 [26-1] by dft Retailers Natl Bank (SRB) (Entered: 01/14/2005)

01/13/2005 31 STIPULATION to extend time to 2/7/05 to answer complaint (amended) [26-1] by pla Christine Baker, dft Equifax Credit [31-1] (DMT) (Entered: 01/18/2005)

01/14/2005 30 ORDER by Judge Neil V. Wake granting stipulation to extend time to answer first amended complaint up to and including 2/7/05 [26-1] by dft Retailers Natl Bank (cc: all counsel) (DMT) (Entered: 01/14/2005)

01/18/2005 32 ORDER by Judge Neil V. Wake granting stipulation to extend time to 2/7/05 for dft Equifax to answer complaint (amended) [26-1] by pla Christine Baker, dft Equifax Credit [31-1] (cc: all counsel) (DMT) (Entered: 01/18/2005)

01/25/2005 33 RESPONSE by pla Christine Baker to motion to dismiss first amended complaint by dft Ameriquest Mortgage [28-1] (SRB) (Entered: 02/01/2005)

01/25/2005 34 RETURN OF SERVICE EXECUTED summons/complaint upon Don Harmer for dft Panda Management on 1/4/05 in NV (SRB) (Entered: 02/01/2005)

01/25/2005 35 RETURN OF SERVICE EXECUTED summons/complaint upon Tracey Rees for dft Capital One Financia on 1/10/05 in VA (SRB) (Entered: 02/01/2005)

01/25/2005 36 RETURN OF SERVICE EXECUTED summons/complaint upon Tina Rogers for dft Capital One Bank on 1/7/05 in VA (SRB) (Entered: 02/01/2005)

01/25/2005 37 RETURN OF SERVICE EXECUTED summons/complaint upon Tina Rogers for dft Capital One Services on 1/7/05 in VA (SRB) (Entered: 02/01/2005)

01/31/2005 38 NOTICE of compliance of initial disclosure statement pursuant to Rule 7.1 by dft Capital One Bank, dft Capital One Services, dft Capital One FSB (FMP) (Entered: 02/04/2005)

01/31/2005 39 MOTION to dismiss complaint (amended) [26-1] by dft Capital One Bank, dft Capital One Services, dft Capital One FSB [39-1] (FMP) (Entered: 02/04/2005)

02/03/2005 40 REPLY by dft Ameriquest Mortgage to response to motion to dismiss first amended complaint by dft Ameriquest Mortgage [28-1] (DMT) (Entered: 02/09/2005)

02/07/2005 41 ANSWER to first amended complaint [26-1] by dft Retailers Natl Bank (SRB) (Entered: 02/15/2005)

02/07/2005 42 ANSWER and affirmative defenses to first amended complaint [26-1] by dft Equifax Credit (SRB) (Entered: 02/15/2005)

02/08/2005 43 NOTICE by dft Retailers Natl Bank of service of answer on new counsel for Capital One dfts (SRB) (Entered: 02/15/2005)

02/18/2005 44 RESPONSE by pla to Motion to dismiss complaint (amended) [26-1] by dft Capital One Bank, dft Capital One Services, dft Capital One FSB [39-1] (SAT) (Entered: 02/24/2005)

02/28/2005 45 REPLY by dft Capital One Bank, dft Capital One Services, dft Capital One FSB to response to motion to dismiss complaint (amended) [26-1] by dft Capital One Bank, dft Capital One Services, dft Capital One FSB [39-1] (KMG) (Entered: 03/07/2005)

04/20/2005 46 ORDER by Judge Neil V. Wake that dft Ameriquest's Motion to dismiss first amended complaint [28-1] is granted in part and denied in part. The Motion is granted as to pla's claims under the Arizona Commercial Electronic Mail statute, the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act, the Arizona Mortgage Brokers statute, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and the Gram-Leach-Bliley Act. The Motion is denied as to pla's claim under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. FURTHER ORDERED that dfts Capital One's Motion to dismiss complaint (amended) [39-1] is granted. FURTHER ORDERED that pla is granted leave until 5/17/05, within which to file an amended complaint is she wishes. If pla does not file an amended complaint stating a claim against dfts Capital One within that time, the court will thereafter and without further notice dismiss this action as against dfts Capital One by final order pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). (cc: all counsel) (KMG) (Entered: 04/20/2005)

05/02/2005 47 ANSWER to complaint (amended) [26-1] by dft Ameriquest Mortgage (SRB) (Entered: 05/03/2005)

05/17/2005 48 SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT by pla;; Jury Trial Demanded [26-1] (SAT) (Entered: 05/27/2005)

05/26/2005 49 ANSWER to 2nd amended complaint) [48-1] by dft Equifax Credit (Equifax Information Service LLC) (LAD) (Entered: 05/27/2005)

06/01/2005 50 ANSWER to complaint (amended) [48-1] by dft Ameriquest Mortgage (KCS) (Entered: 06/03/2005)

06/03/2005 51 MOTION to dismiss second amended complaint [48-1] by dft Capital One Services, dft Capital One FSB [51-1] (SRB) (Entered: 06/06/2005)

06/03/2005 52 ANSWER to second amended complaint (amended) [48-1] by dft Capital One Bank (SRB) (Entered: 06/06/2005)

06/08/2005 53 ANSWER to complaint (second amended) [48-1] by dft Retailers Natl Bank (LSP) (Entered: 06/09/2005)

06/09/2005 54 NOTICE by dft Capital One Bank, dft Capital One Services, dft Capital One FSB of filing origianl declaration of Christopher Lane (SRB) (Entered: 06/10/2005)

07/06/2005 55 RESPONSE in Opposition re [51] Motion to Dismiss 2nd Amended Complaint filed by Christine Baker. (KCS) (Entered: 07/09/2005)

07/06/2005 56 DECLARATION of Christine Baker in support re [55] Response in Opposition to Motion by Plaintiff Christine Baker. (KCS) (Entered: 07/09/2005)

07/14/2005 57 MOTION for Summary Disposition (Ruling) Dfts re [51] Motion to Dismiss (Case) Second Amended Complaint by Capital One Services, and Capital One FSB. (KMG, ) (Entered: 07/18/2005)

07/25/2005 58 RESPONSE to Motion for summary disposition re [57] MOTION for Ruling re [51] Motion to Dismiss Case filed by Christine Baker. (KCS) (Entered: 07/26/2005)
07/25/2005 59 MOTION for permission to file electronically by pla Christine Baker. (KCS) (Entered: 07/26/2005)

08/01/2005 60 REPLY to Response to Motion re [51] Motion to Dismiss Case filed by Capital One Bank. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A)(Biesterveld, Kathleen) (Entered: 08/01/2005)

08/03/2005 61 ORDER granting [51] Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint as to Dfts Capital One, F.S.B. and Captial One Services, Inc ONLY, finding as moot [57] Motion for Ruling on Motion to Dismiss and denying w/o prejudice [59] Motion for Permission to File Electronically to filing a renewed request accompanied by the necessary forms . Signed by Judge Neil V. Wake on 8/3/05. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibits-Necessary Forms) (LSP) (Entered: 08/03/2005)

08/04/2005 Copy of document number 61, mailed to Christine Baker on this date. (EAT, ) (Entered: 08/04/2005)

08/04/2005 62 ORDER issued. Scheduling Conference set for 11/4/2005 at 09:30 AM before Judge Neil V. Wake. Show Cause Hearing set for 11/4/2005 at 09:30 AM before Judge Neil V. Wake. Signed by Judge Neil V. Wake on 8/4/05. (SJF) (Entered: 08/04/2005)

08/05/2005 Copy of document number 62 mailed to Christine Baker on this date. (SJF) (Entered: 08/05/2005)

08/09/2005 63 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Retailers National Bank. (Dioguardi, Jennifer) (Entered: 08/09/2005)

08/09/2005 64 STATEMENT of Facts re 63 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Defendant Retailers National Bank. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A-D)(Dioguardi, Jennifer) (Entered: 08/09/2005)

08/15/2005 65 MOTION to allow electronic filing by a party appearing without an attorney and supporting information by Christine Baker. (lodged an order) (TLJ) (Entered: 08/17/2005)

08/31/2005 66 Notice re Errata by Retailers National Bank (Attachments: # 1 Errata)(Dioguardi, Jennifer) (Entered: 08/31/2005)

09/08/2005 67 ORDER granting 65 Motion to Allow Electronic Filing by a Party Appearing Without and Attorney . Signed by Judge Neil V Wake on 9/2/05. (Attachments: # 1 Registration Form with instructions) (LSP) (Entered: 09/08/2005)

09/08/2005 Copy of document number 67, mailed to Joseph M Udall and Christine Baker on this date. (LSP) (Entered: 09/08/2005)

09/14/2005 68 RESPONSE to Motion re 63 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Christine Baker. (TLJ, ) (Entered: 09/15/2005)

09/14/2005 69 MEMORANDUM opposing re 63 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Plaintiff Christine Baker. (TLJ, ) (Entered: 09/15/2005)

09/14/2005 70 AFFIDAVIT of Christine Baker in support re 68 Response to Motion by Plaintiff Christine Baker. (TLJ, ) (Entered: 09/15/2005)

09/14/2005 71 RESPONSE re 64 Statement of Facts by Plaintiff Christine Baker. (TLJ, ) (Entered: 09/15/2005)

09/29/2005 72 Due to a conflict in the Court's calendar, IT IS ORDERED the Scheduling Conference and Order to Show Cause Hearing, presently set for 11/4/05 at 9:30 a.m., is VACATED and RESET. Scheduling Conference and Order to Show Cause Hearing are hereby reset for 11/15/2005 at 04:30 PM before Judge Neil V Wake.(SJF)(This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (Entered: 09/29/2005)

09/29/2005 73 First MOTION for Extension of Time To File Reply Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment by Retailers National Bank. (Dioguardi, Jennifer) (Entered: 09/29/2005)

09/30/2005 74 Notice re Certificate of Service by Retailers National Bank re 73 First MOTION for Extension of Time To File Reply Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment (Dioguardi, Jennifer) (Entered: 09/30/2005)

09/30/2005 75 IT IS ORDERED granting 73 Defendant's Motion for Extension of Time. Defendant RNB shall have until 10/24/2005 to file its reply to its Motion for Summary Judgment. Entered by Judge Neil V. Wake on 9/30/2005. (NVW, )(This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (Entered: 09/30/2005)
10/25/2005 76 Notice re Service of Initial Disclosures by Capital One Bank (Biesterveld, Kathleen) (Entered: 10/25/2005)

10/25/2005 77 STIPULATION of Dismissal With Prejudice by Ameriquest Mortgage. (Messing, Jeffrey) (Entered: 10/25/2005)

10/26/2005 78 ORDER granting 77 STIPULATION of Dismissal With Prejudice by Ameriquest Mortgage. (Messing, Jeffrey). Dismissing Dft Ameriquest Mortgage ONLY, with prejudice, the parties to bear their own attorney fees and costs. Signed by Judge Neil V Wake on 10/26/05. (LSP) (Entered: 10/26/2005)

10/27/2005 79 REPLY to Response to Motion re 63 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Retailers National Bank. (Dioguardi, Jennifer) (Entered: 10/27/2005)

10/27/2005 80 Notice re of Service by Retailers National Bank of Initial Disclosure (Dioguardi, Jennifer) (Entered: 10/27/2005)

10/27/2005 81 OBJECTION re 68 Response to Motion, 69 Memorandum, 71 Response, 70 Affidavit and Objection re Exhibits by Defendants Retailers National Bank, Retailers National Bank filed by Retailers National Bank, Retailers National Bank. (Dioguardi, Jennifer) (Entered: 10/27/2005)

10/27/2005 82 Notice of service of initial disclosures by Christine Baker (TLJ, ) (Entered: 10/28/2005)

10/28/2005 83 Due to a conflict in the court's calendar, IT IS ORDERED the Rule 16 scheduling conference presently set for 11/15/2005 is VACATED and RESET for 11/17/2005 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 504, 401 West Washington Street, Phoenix, AZ 85003, before Judge Neil V. Wake.(NVW, )(This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (Entered: 10/28/2005)

11/01/2005 84 MOTION to Strike 81 Objection,, 79 Reply to Response to Motion by Christine Baker. (Baker, Christine) (Entered: 11/01/2005)

11/08/2005 85 MOTION for telephonic appearance by Christine Baker. (Baker, Christine) (Entered: 11/08/2005)

11/09/2005 86 IT IS ORDERED denying 85 Plaintiff's Request for Permission of Telephonic Appearance. The court will consider any future request to appear by telephone at court hearings on a case by case basis. Entered by Judge Neil V. Wake on 11/9/2005. (NVW, )(This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (Entered: 11/09/2005)

11/10/2005 87 REPORT Joint Proposed Case Management Plan by Christine Baker. (Baker, Christine) Modified on 11/14/2005 (LSP). INCORRECT EVENT SELECTED. THIS ENTRY HAS BEEN MODIFIED FROM "Joint Motion for" TO "REPORT" (Entered: 11/10/2005)

11/14/2005 88 NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCY re 87 Joint MOTION for REPORT of Joint Proposed Case Management Plan filed by Christine Baker. Description of deficiency: Incorrect document type selected. (LSP) (Entered: 11/14/2005)

11/16/2005 89 RESPONSE to Motion re 84 MOTION to Strike 81 Objection,, 79 Reply to Response to Motion to Strike Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Retailers National Bank. (Dioguardi, Jennifer) (Entered: 11/16/2005)

11/17/2005 90 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Neil V Wake : Scheduling Conference held on 11/17/2005, Show Cause Hearing held on 11/17/2005. Anthony Ferlanti and Panda Management Company, Inc. terminated.. (Court Reporter Laurie Adams.) (SJF) (Entered: 11/17/2005)

11/17/2005 91 SCHEDULING ORDER issued: Discovery due by 3/31/2006. Dispositive motions due by 4/14/2006. Proposed Pretrial Order due by 4/28/2006. Signed by Judge Neil V Wake on 11/17/05. (SJF) (Entered: 11/17/2005)

11/27/2005 92 REPLY to Response to Motion re 84 MOTION to Strike 81 Objection,, 79 Reply to Response to Motion filed by Christine Baker. (Baker, Christine) (Entered: 11/27/2005)

12/15/2005 93 ORDER denying 84 Motion to Strike. Plaintiff shall have until 12/29/2005 to respond to defendant's evidentiary objections. Signed by Judge Neil V. Wake on 12/15/2005. (NVW, ) (Entered: 12/15/2005)

12/16/2005 94 Notice re of Service of Discovery Requests by Equifax Information Services, LLC (Coffey, Rodrick) (Entered: 12/16/2005)

12/29/2005 95 RESPONSE re 81 Objection, by Plaintiff Christine Baker. (Baker, Christine) (Entered: 12/29/2005)

01/04/2006 96 Notice re Joinder in Defendant Equifax's Request for Production of Documents by Capital One Bank (Biesterveld, Kathleen) (Entered: 01/04/2006)

01/04/2006 97 Notice re Service of First Set of Discovery Requests by Capital One Bank (Biesterveld, Kathleen) (Entered: 01/04/2006)

01/09/2006 98 Reply re 81 Objection,, 95 Response by Defendant Retailers National Bank. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Dioguardi, Jennifer) (Entered: 01/09/2006)

01/17/2006 99 STIPULATION re 91 Scheduling Order Joint Stipulation to Extend Deadline to Conduct Good Faith Settlement Talks by Christine Baker, Equifax Information Services, LLC, Retailers National Bank, Capital One Bank. (Dioguardi, Jennifer) (Entered: 01/17/2006)

01/18/2006 100 ORDER granting 99 Joint Stipulation to Extend Deadline to Conduct Good Faith Settlement Talks. Signed by Judge Neil V. Wake on 1/18/2006. (NVW, ) (Entered: 01/18/2006)

01/18/2006 101 Notice re Service by Retailers National Bank of First Set of Requests for Production of Documents to Plaintiff and First Set of Non-Uniform Interrogatories to Plaintiff (Dioguardi, Jennifer) (Entered: 01/18/2006)

01/20/2006 102 Notice re Service by Plaintiff of First Set of Requests for Admissions, Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents to Defendants Retailers National Bank, Capital One Bank and Equifax Information Services LLC by Christine Baker (Baker, Christine) (Entered: 01/20/2006)

01/24/2006 103 ORDER granting 63 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Neil V. Wake on 1/24/2006. (NVW, ) (Entered: 01/24/2006)

01/26/2006 104 MOTION for Leave to Appear: TELEPHONICALLY by Capital One Bank. (Biesterveld, Kathleen) (Entered: 01/26/2006)

02/02/2006 105 MOTION for Leave to Appear: Telephonically by Equifax Information Services, LLC. (Coffey, Rodrick) (Entered: 02/02/2006)

02/10/2006 106 MOTION for Reconsideration and in the alternative, motion to permit discovery by Christine Baker. (Baker, Christine) (Entered: 02/10/2006)

02/15/2006 107 ORDER granting 104 Motion for Leave to Appear Telephonically. Signed by Judge Neil V. Wake on 2/15/2006. (NVW, ) (Entered: 02/15/2006)

02/22/2006 108 Notice re Service by Retailers National Bank of Its Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of Requests for Admissions, Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents (Dioguardi, Jennifer) (Entered: 02/22/2006)

02/22/2006 109 Notice re of Service of Discovery Responses by Equifax Information Services, LLC (Coffey, Rodrick) (Entered: 02/22/2006)

02/22/2006 110 ORDER denying 106 Motion for Reconsideration and alternative motion to permit discovery. Signed by Judge Neil V. Wake on 2/22/2006. (NVW, ) (Entered: 02/22/2006)

02/22/2006 111 Notice re SERVICE OF RESPONSES TO FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS by Capital One Bank (Biesterveld, Kathleen) (Entered: 02/22/2006)

02/22/2006 112 MOTION for Admission Pro Hac Vice by Lewis P Perling on behalf of Equifax Information Services, LLC. (BAS, ) (Entered: 02/23/2006)

02/23/2006 113 ORDER pursuant to General Order 05-25 granting 112 Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice.Per the Court's Administrative Policies and Procedures Manual, applicant has five (5) days in which to register as a user of the Electronic Filing System. Registration to be accomplished via the court's website at www.azd.uscourts.gov. (BAS, )(This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (Entered: 02/23/2006)

02/23/2006 114 IT IS ORDERED granting 105 Equifax Information Services LLC's Motion to Appear Telephonically. A representative of Equifax Information Services LLC, with full settlement authority, may appear telephonically at the settlement conference to occur on February 27, 2006. Entered by Judge Neil V. Wake on 2/23/2006. (NVW, )(This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (Entered: 02/23/2006)

03/02/2006 115 REPORT of Joint Report on Settlement Talks by Plaintiff Christine Baker, Defendants Equifax Information Services, LLC, Retailers National Bank, Capital One Bank. (Dioguardi, Jennifer) (Entered: 03/02/2006)

04/12/2006 116 NOTICE of Acceptance with Offer of Judgment by Retailers National Bank (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Offer of Judgment# 2 Exhibit Acceptance of Offer of Judgment)(Dioguardi, Jennifer) (Entered: 04/12/2006)

04/12/2006 117 LODGED Proposed re: 116 Notice of Acceptance with Offer of Judgment; Judgment submitted on April 12, 2006. Document to be filed by Clerk if Motion to Amend is granted. filed by Retailers National Bank (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Form of Judgment)(Dioguardi, Jennifer) (Entered: 04/12/2006)

04/12/2006 118 MOTION for Extension of Time (Stipulated) for Defendant Equifax to File Dispositive Motion by Equifax Information Services, LLC. (Coffey, Rodrick) (Entered: 04/12/2006)

04/12/2006 119 Notice re Service of Plaintiff's First Supplemental Initial Disclosures by Christine Baker (Baker, Christine) (Entered: 04/12/2006)

04/12/2006 120 IT IS ORDERED granting 118 Stipulated Motion for Extension of Time until 4/25/2006 for Defendant Equifax to file its dispositive motion. Entered by Judge Neil V. Wake on 4/12/2006. (NVW, )(This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (Entered: 04/12/2006)

04/13/2006 121 JUDGMENT-IT IS HEREBY ORDERED entering Judgment against Target and in favor of plaintiff on plaintiff's claims against Target that were not previously resolved by this Court's order dated January 24, 2006, [b]in the sum of $2,500.00, inclusive of plaintiff's substantive claim, costs accrued and attorneys' fees incurred, if any. . Signed by Judge Neil V Wake on 4/12/06. (TLJ) (Entered: 04/13/2006) [/b]

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WOO-HOO~ $2,500.00 SHE IS MAKING MONEY NOW. WHAT A WASTE OF TIME AND RESOURCES OF THE COURT.
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04/14/2006 122 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Capital One Bank. (Biesterveld, Kathleen) (Entered: 04/14/2006)

04/17/2006 124 Notice re Errata by Capital One Bank (Biesterveld, Kathleen) (Entered: 04/17/2006)

04/25/2006 125 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Equifax Information Services, LLC. (Coffey, Rodrick) (Entered: 04/25/2006)

05/14/2006 127 MOTION for Extension of Time to Respond to the Capital One Motion for Summary Judgment and to Conduct Discovery by Christine Baker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2)(Baker, Christine) (Entered: 05/14/2006)

05/15/2006 128 NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCY re [123] Statement of Facts filed by Capital One Bank. Description of deficiency: Personal identifiers must be either excluded or partially redacted from any document filed in a civil or a criminal case, whether filed in paper or electronic form. (APJ, ) (Entered: 05/15/2006)

05/16/2006 129 ORDER denying 127 Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time and to Conduct Additional Discovery. Signed by Judge Neil V. Wake on 5/16/2006. (NVW, ) (Entered: 05/16/2006)

05/16/2006 130 NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCY re [126] Statement of Facts filed by Equifax Information Services, LLC. Description of deficiency: Document contains personal identifiers. Personal identifiers must be either excluded or partially redacted from any document filed in a civil or a criminal case, whether filed in paper or electronic form. (APJ, ) (Entered: 05/16/2006)

05/16/2006 131 STATEMENT of FACTS by Defendant Capital One Bank. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Index of Exhibits# 2 Exhibit 1.1# 3 Exhibit 1.2# 4 Exhibit 1.3# 5 Exhibit 2.1# 6 Exhibit 2.2# 7 Exhibit 2.3# 8 Exhibit 3.1# 9 Exhibit 3.2# 10 Exhibit 3.3# 11 Exhibit 4.1# 12 Exhibit 4.2# 13 Exhibit 5)(Biesterveld, Kathleen) (Entered: 05/16/2006)
05/17/2006 133 STATEMENT of Facts (Second Amended) in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendant Equifax Information Services, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C)(Coffey, Rodrick) (Entered: 05/17/2006)
05/19/2006 134 NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCY re [132] Amended Statement of Facts filed by Equifax Information Services, LLC. Description of deficiency: Documents contain personal identifiers. Personal identifiers must be either excluded or partially redacted from any document filed in a civil or a criminal case, whether filed in paper or electronic form. (APJ, ) (Entered: 05/19/2006)

05/22/2006 135 MOTION for Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment by Capital One Bank. (Biesterveld, Kathleen) (Entered: 05/22/2006)

05/22/2006 136 Additional Attachments to Main Document re 135 MOTION for Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment Order by Defendant Capital One Bank. (Biesterveld, Kathleen) (Entered: 05/22/2006)

05/23/2006 137 RESPONSE in Opposition re 122 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Capital One filed by Christine Baker. (Baker, Christine) (Entered: 05/23/2006)

05/23/2006 138 AFFIDAVIT in Opposition re 122 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Capital One filed by Christine Baker. (Baker, Christine) (Entered: 05/23/2006)

05/23/2006 139 STATEMENT of Controverting Facts and Exhibits re 137 Response in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment by Capital One by Plaintiff Christine Baker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit L# 2 Exhibit M-1# 3 Exhibit M-2# 4 Exhibit M-3# 5 Exhibit M-4# 6 Exhibit N)(Baker, Christine) (Entered: 05/23/2006)

05/23/2006 140 NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCY re 135 MOTION for Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Capital One Bank. Description of deficiency: Document does not contain a signature. (LAD) (Entered: 05/23/2006)

05/23/2006 141 AMENDED MOTION for Ruling re 135 Motion for Ruling on its Motion for Summary Judgment by Capital One Bank. (Biesterveld, Kathleen) (Entered: 05/23/2006)

05/25/2006 142 ORDER denying 135141 Defendant's Motions for Summary Disposition. Signed by Judge Neil V. Wake on 5/25/2006. (NVW, ) (Entered: 05/25/2006)

05/25/2006 143 First MOTION for Extension of Time to respond to the Equifax Motion for Summary Judgment by Christine Baker. (Baker, Christine) (Entered: 05/25/2006)

05/25/2006 144 IT IS ORDERED granting 143 Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time until 6/5/2006 to file response to Defendant Equifax's Motion for Summary Judgment. Entered by Judge Neil V. Wake on 5/25/2006. (NVW, )(This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (Entered: 05/25/2006)

06/08/2006 145 RESPONSE in Opposition re 125 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Equifax filed by Christine Baker. (Baker, Christine) (Entered: 06/08/2006)

06/09/2006 146 STATEMENT of Controverting Facts, Affidavit and Exhibits re 145 Response in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment by Plaintiff Christine Baker. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit by Christine Baker# 2 Exhibit listing of Exhibits O - R# 3 Exhibit O -- FTC Report# 4 Exhibit P - part 1# 5 Exhibit P - part 2# 6 Exhibit P - part 3# 7 Exhibit P - part 4# 8 Exhibit P - part 5# 9 Exhibit Q# 10 Exhibit R)(Baker, Christine) (Entered: 06/09/2006)

06/12/2006 147 REPLY to Response to Motion re 122 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Capital One Bank. (Biesterveld, Kathleen) (Entered: 06/12/2006)

06/12/2006 148 OBJECTION TO PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT by Defendant Capital One Bank. (Biesterveld, Kathleen) (Entered: 06/12/2006)

06/26/2006 149 RESPONSE in Support re 125 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Equifax Information Services, LLC. (Coffey, Rodrick) (Entered: 06/26/2006)

06/27/2006 150 SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT re 121 Judgment, Retailers National Bank by Christine Baker. (Baker, Christine) (Entered: 06/27/2006)

06/29/2006 151 RESPONSE re 148 Objection by Capital One to Affidavit by Plaintiff in Support of her Objection to the Capital One Motion for Summary Judgment by Plaintiff Christine Baker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit O)(Baker, Christine) (Entered: 06/29/2006)

07/10/2006 152 Reply re 148 Objection by Defendant Capital One Bank. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Biesterveld, Kathleen) (Entered: 07/10/2006)

08/30/2006 153 ORDER granting Capital One's 122 Motion for Summary Judgment, granting Equifax's 125 Motion for Summary Judgment; FURTHER ORDERED that the clerk enter judgment in favor of dft Capital One Bank and dft Equifax Information Services LLC and that pla Christine Baker take nothing on her complaint; the clerk shall terminate this action. Signed by Judge Neil V Wake on 8/29/2006. (LAD) (Entered: 08/30/2006)

08/30/2006 154 CLERK'S JUDGMENT: ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Court having granted Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, judgment is entered in favor of Defendant Capital One Bank and Defendant Equifax Information Services, LLC. Plaintiff shall take nothing on her Complaint and this action is hereby dismissed.(LAD) (Entered: 08/30/2006)

09/06/2006 155 AMENDED JUDGMENT: ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Court having granted Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, judgment is entered in favor of Defendant Capital One Bank and Defendant Equifax Information Services, LLC. Plaintiff shall take nothing on her complaint and this action is hereby dismissed. (This judgment amended only to reflect that it was entered upon decision of the Court and not upon a jury verdict).(LAD) (Entered: 09/06/2006)

09/11/2006 156 MOTION for Attorney Fees Motion for Fees and Related Non-Taxable Expenses by Capital One Bank, Capital One Services, Capital One FSB. (Goodwin, Nicole) (Entered: 09/11/2006)

09/26/2006 157 RESPONSE in Opposition re 156 MOTION for Attorney Fees Motion for Fees and Related Non-Taxable Expenses by Capital One Bank, Capital One Services, Capital One FSB filed by Christine Baker. (Baker, Christine) (Entered: 09/26/2006)

09/26/2006 158 NOTICE OF APPEAL to 9th Circuit, as to 103 Order on Motion for Summary Judgment, 153 Order on Motion for Summary Judgment, 155 Judgment, by Christine Baker. Filing fee $455. (Baker, Christine) Modified on 9/27/2006 (DMT, ). DOCKET TEXT MODIFIED TO CORRECT DOCUMENT LINKAGE. (Entered: 09/26/2006)

09/26/2006 USCA Appeal Fees received $ 455 receipt number PHX048614 re 158 Notice of Appeal, filed by Christine Baker, (DMT, ) (Entered: 09/27/2006)

09/27/2006 159 Notice of Appeal Notification Form; Notice of Appeal and copy of docket sheet transmitted to Ninth Circuit and all parties re 158 Notice of Appeal, (DMT, ) (Entered: 09/27/2006)

10/05/2006 160 ORDER that pla may file and serve a responsive memorandum and evidence within 15 days after service of dft's memorandum to be filed by 11/6/06 re 156 157. Signed by Judge Neil V Wake on 10/4/06. (TLJ) (Entered: 10/05/2006)

10/11/2006 161 Ninth Circuit Case Number 06-16849 for 158 Notice of Appeal,. (DMT, ) (Entered: 10/11/2006)

10/18/2006 162 TRANSCRIPT DESIGNATION AND ORDER FORM by Capital One Bank for proceedings held on 11/17/2005 before Judge Neil V. Wake. (Roddy, Michelle) (Entered: 10/18/2006)

10/19/2006 163 TRANSCRIPT of Motion Hearing Proceedings held on 11/17/05 before Judge Neil V Wake. Court Reporter: Laurie A Adams. (BAS, ) (Entered: 10/19/2006)

11/03/2006 164 MEMORANDUM re 156 MOTION for Attorney Fees Motion for Fees and Related Non-Taxable Expenses by Defendant Capital One Bank. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Index - Exhibits A-C# 2 Exhibit EX D-H# 3 Exhibit EX I - Sec. 1# 4 Exhibit EX I Sec. 2 & EX J)(Roddy, Michelle) (Entered: 11/03/2006)

11/20/2006 165 RESPONSE to Motion re 156 MOTION for Attorney Fees Motion for Fees and Related Non-Taxable Expenses and Memorandum filed by Christine Baker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exh. A: Order denying dismissal of conspiracy claim against Ameriquest# 2 Exhibit Exh. B: CDIA Credit Reporting Resource Guide)(Baker, Christine) (Entered: 11/20/2006)

12/05/2006 166 REPLY in Support re 156 MOTION for Attorney Fees Motion for Fees and Related Non-Taxable Expenses filed by Capital One Bank. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A-C)(Roddy, Michelle) (Entered: 12/05/2006)
_________________
David Szwak
Chairman, Consumer Protection Section, Louisiana State Bar Association
Bodenheimer, Jones & Szwak, LLC
416 Travis Street, Suite 1404
Mid South Tower
Shreveport, Louisiana 71101
318-424-1400
Fax 318-221-6555

[Administrator]

here is her latest nightmare filing - "...if at first you do not succeed, ...."

25MAG, STD

U.S. District Court
DISTRICT OF ARIZONA (Prescott Division)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:06-cv-02927-NVW

Baker v. TransUnion, LLC et al
Assigned to: Judge Neil V Wake
Cause: 15:1681 Fair Credit Reporting Act
Date Filed: 12/06/2006
Jury Demand: None
Nature of Suit: 890 Other Statutory Actions
Jurisdiction: Federal Question
Plaintiff
Christine Baker represented by Christine Baker
HC 37 Box 2126
Meadview, AZ 86444
(206)202-4653
Fax: (571)222-1000
PRO SE


V.

Defendant
TransUnion, LLC

Defendant
Equifax Information Services, LLC

Defendant
Focus Receivables Management, LLC

Defendant
James Hurd

Defendant
Directv Inc

Defendant
Dana Capital Group

Defendant
NCO Financial Systems, Inc.


Date Filed # Docket Text

12/06/2006 1 COMPLAINT, filed by Christine Baker.(ESL) (Entered: 12/06/2006)

12/06/2006 2 Filing fee paid 12/06/06, receipt number PHX051711. This case has been assigned to the Honorable Virginia A. Mathis. All future pleadings or documents should bear the correct case number: CV06-2927-PHX-VAM. Magistrate Election form attached. (Attachments: # 1 Instructions) (ESL) (Entered: 12/06/2006)

12/07/2006 3 Minute Order Due to a clerical error, this case is now assigned to United States District Judge Neil V Wake. Judge Virginia A Mathis no longer assigned to case. Future filings should reflect the following case number CV06-2927-PCT-NVW. This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no PDF document associated with this entry. (ESL, ) (Entered: 12/07/2006)

12/07/2006 4 Summons Issued as to TransUnion, LLC, Equifax Information Services, LLC, Focus Receivables Management, LLC, James Hurd, Directv Inc, Dana Capital Group, NCO Financial Systems, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Equifax# 2 Focus# 3 James# 4 Directv# 5 Dana Capital# 6 NCO)(ESL, ) (Entered: 12/07/2006)
_________________
David Szwak
Chairman, Consumer Protection Section, Louisiana State Bar Association
Bodenheimer, Jones & Szwak, LLC
416 Travis Street, Suite 1404
Mid South Tower
Shreveport, Louisiana 71101
318-424-1400
Fax 318-221-6555

[Administrator]

989 So. Main St. A-150
Cottonwood, Arizona 86326
Email Address: christine@bayhouse.com
Phone: 206-202-4653
Fax: 571-222-1000
_________________
David Szwak
Chairman, Consumer Protection Section, Louisiana State Bar Association
Bodenheimer, Jones & Szwak, LLC
416 Travis Street, Suite 1404
Mid South Tower
Shreveport, Louisiana 71101
318-424-1400
Fax 318-221-6555

[Administrator]

File Number: L-0954135-0
Corp. Name: BAYHOUSE, L.L.C.



Domestic Address 989 S MAIN ST #A 150
COTTONWOOD, AZ 86326


Statutory Agent Information Agent Name: BROWN LAW FIRM

Agent Mailing/Physical Address:
% CLINT A BROWN
141 S MCCORMICK #211
PRESCOTT, AZ 86303

Agent Status: APPOINTED 06/21/2000
Agent Last Updated:


Officer and Director Information Name: CHRISTINE BAKER
Title: MEMBER
Address: 989 S MAIN ST STE A 150
COTTONWOOD, AZ 86326
Date Assigned: 06/21/2000 Last Updated: 07/20/2000



Additional Corporate Information Corporation Type: DOMESTIC L.L.C.
Incorporation Date: 06/21/2000 Corporate Life Period: PERPETUAL
Domicile: ARIZONA County: YAVAPAI
Approval Date: 06/21/2000 Original Publish Date: 07/17/2000
_________________
David Szwak
Chairman, Consumer Protection Section, Louisiana State Bar Association
Bodenheimer, Jones & Szwak, LLC
416 Travis Street, Suite 1404
Mid South Tower
Shreveport, Louisiana 71101
318-424-1400
Fax 318-221-6555

[Administrator]

Baker v. Fair, Isaac and Co., Inc.
Slip Copy, 2006 WL 2668981
D.Ariz.,2006.
September 15, 2006

Christine Baker, Meadview, AZ, pro se.
Marc Stephen Carlson, Richard J. Grabowski, Jones Day, Irvine, CA, Timothy Joel Eckstein, Osborn Maledon PA, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendants.


ORDER


ROBERT C. BROOMFIELD, Senior District Judge.
*1 On August 30, 2006, one of the defendants herein, Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (“Experian”), filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, or, in the alternative, “for partial summary judgment in its favor on Plaintiff's claims pursuant to the Fair Credit Reporting Act ···, the Arizona Fair Credit Reporting Act, and Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages.” Doc. 308 at 1. In support of its motion, among other things, Experian filed a Declaration by Kimberly Hughes. Five exhibits are attached to that Declaration. The first three exhibits are plaintiff's February 4, 2003, February 10, 2003 and May 5, 2003 Experian “Personal Credit Report[s][.]” Doc. 316, exhs. 1, 2 and 3 thereto. Exhibits four and five are “Investigation Results” which Experian “prepared for” plaintiff on November 10, 2005, and April 11, 2006, respectively. Id., exhs. 4 and 5 thereto.

By motion dated September 12, 2006, plaintiff pro se Christine Baker is requesting that those exhibits be “immediately and permanently removed from public access[.]” Doc. 317 at 1 and 2. Plaintiff bases this motion upon her belief that the Hughes' Declaration exhibits contain “identifying information” in violation of this District's Electronic Case Filing Administrative Policies and Procedures Manual (“Manual”). Id. at 2. On this motion plaintiff Baker is further requesting to “be provided with the identity of any PACER users who may have accessed her credit reports[ ]” by viewing the five exhibits to the Hughes' Declaration. Id. at 1 and 3.



Discussion



I. “Policy Manual”

Section I(E) of the Manual governs redaction of court filings based upon privacy concerns. More specifically, subsection 1 states that “nless otherwise ordered by the court, parties must refrain, or must partially redact where inclusion is necessary, the following personal identifiers from all pleadings and documents filed with the court including exhibits thereto [.]” Policy Manual at 4, § I(E)(1) (emphasis added). In accordance with the Manual, “[t]he responsibility for redacting personal identifiers rests solely with the parties.” Id. at 5, § I(E)(1). Among the enumerated “personal identifiers” are social security numbers, dates of birth, and “[f]inancial account numbers[.]” Id. at 4-5, § I(E)(1)(a), (c) and (d).

A careful review of the five exhibits (totaling 70 pages) to the Hughes' Declaration shows that plaintiff's telephone number and Arizona Driver's License number each appear once therein. The court declines to order redaction of those numbers, however, because the Manual does not deem the same to be “personal identifiers” subject to redaction under section I(E)(1).

On the other hand, in violation of section I(E)(1)(c) of the Manual, plaintiff's full date of birth does appear in two of the exhibits to the Hughes' Declaration. See Doc. 316, exh. 4 thereto at 13; and exh. 5 thereto at 15. That section expressly provides that “[i]f an individual's date of birth must be included ···, only the year should be used.” Id. at 5, § I(E)(1)(c) (emphasis added). Whether plaintiff's date of birth “must be included” in these exhibits is doubtful. However because it has been included, in accordance with the Manual, the court orders redaction of the month and date of plaintiff's birth.

*2 Turning next to the “financial account numbers” contained in the Hughes' Declaration exhibits, subsection I(E)(1)(d) of the Manual states that “[i]f [such] numbers are relevant, only the last four digits ··· should be used.” Id. at 5, § I(E)(1)(d) (emphasis added). In the present case Experian did the opposite. When listing plaintiff's “Credit items,” Experian set forth the “Source/Account number (except [the] last few digits).” See, e.g., Doc. 316, exh.1 at 3 (emphasis added). Experian's omission of the “last few digits” of each of plaintiff's financial account numbers serves the Manual's purpose in terms of protecting plaintiff's privacy by not disclosing any financial account number in full. Thus, the court will not order redaction of any of the 129 account numbers contained in the Hughes' Declaration exhibits.

[u]As an aside, the court observes that nowhere in any of these five exhibits does plaintiff's social security number appear. In fact, on each of the five exhibits which are the subject of this motion Experian plainly states that “[a]s a security precaution, [it] did not list the Social Security number that” Experian was given when it was “contacted[.]” Id., exh. 1 at 11, exh. 2 at 14, exh. 3 at 11, exh. 4 at 13, and exh. 5 at 15 (emphases added). Thus, insofar as protecting the disclosure of plaintiff's social security number, Experian has provided even greater protection than the Manual which requires “only [that] the last four ··· digits of that number ··· be used.” Manual at 4, § I(E)(1)(a).



II. PACER Users

The last issue which this motion presents is whether the court should provide plaintiff “with the identity of any PACER users who may have accessed her credit reports[ ]” by viewing the exhibits to the Hughes' Declaration. Doc. 317 at 1. The court has been advised by the Operation's Manager for the Clerk's Office of the District of Arizona that it cannot be ascertained whether any PACER users may have viewed these exhibits. Given the impossibility of providing this relief, the court denies the same.

Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff Christine Baker's Motion to Enforce Privacy Rules and to Remove Credit Reports Filed by Defendant Experian Information Systems (Doc. 317) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. More specifically, it is ORDERED that defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc. redact the month and date of plaintiff's birth from exhibits 4 and 5 of the Hughes' Declaration (Doc. 316).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in all future filings in this action defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc. shall fully comply with the Manual's privacy section, including the format in which financial account numbers and dates of birth should be provided.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff Christine Baker's motion (Doc. 317) is DENIED to the extent she is seeking “the identity of any PACERS users who may have accessed her credit reports.”

*3 IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that in all other respects plaintiff Christine Baker's motion (Doc. 317) is DENIED.
_________________
David Szwak
Chairman, Consumer Protection Section, Louisiana State Bar Association
Bodenheimer, Jones & Szwak, LLC
416 Travis Street, Suite 1404
Mid South Tower
Shreveport, Louisiana 71101
318-424-1400
Fax 318-221-6555

[Administrator]

Baker v. Capital One Bank
Slip Copy, 2006 WL 2523440
D.Ariz.,2006.
August 29, 2006

Christine Baker, Meadview, AZ, pro se.
Lewis P. Perling, Kilpatrick Stockton LLP, Atlanta, GA, Rodrick Joseph Coffey, Stinson Morrison Hecker LLP, Kathleen Ann Biesterveld, Kevin Duffy Quigley, Quarles & Brady Streich Lang LLP, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendants.


ORDER


NEIL V. WAKE, District Judge.
*1 The court has considered Defendant Capital One Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. # 122) and Defendant Equifax Information Services, L.L.C.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. # 125).

Plaintiff Christine Baker brought this action against various defendants alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. The two remaining defendants in the case, Equifax Information Services, L.L.C. (“Equifax”) and Capital One Bank (“Capital One”), now move for summary judgment.



I. Overview of Baker's Claims

Since the 1990s, Capital One has issued Baker four credit cards. Capital One reports information about Baker, as its customer, to credit reporting agencies such as Equifax. The agencies then report that information to parties seeking to use it for certain permissible purposes. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b.

Although Baker raises several claims against Capital One, a central complaint for Baker is that Capital One does not report its cardholders' credit limits. Baker has argued that a credit card company's failure to report its cardholders' credit limits leads to a reduction in the cardholders' FICO credit scores. As a result, users of credit information employing FICO credit scores in their decisionmaking-such as insurance companies determining what rate to charge, e.g., Reynolds v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Group, 435 F.3d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir.2006)-make decisions unfavorable or less favorable to such cardholders. Baker's evidence suggests that, up to this point at least, she is correct.

One of the “most important factors” used in determining a consumer's FICO credit score is the “proportion of balances to credit limits” in their revolving accounts. (Doc. # 137 Ex. M-1 at 3 (Equifax “myFICO” score report and explanation).) As argued by Baker and strongly suggested by the evidence, if a credit card company has not reported its cardholder's credit limit, FICO score generators substitute the cardholder's “high credit” amount in place of the credit limit when calculating this important factor. ( See id. at Ex. M-1 at 3:5.) The “high credit” amount, which is the largest amount the cardholder has utilized in any one cycle from the creditor, is generally lower than the cardholder's credit limit (except, of course, for cardholders that at some time have exceeded their permitted credit limit). The resultingly higher proportion of balance to credit limit resulting where the “high credit” amount is used negatively affects the cardholder's overall FICO credit score. Despite this arbitrarily harmful result, it appears that Capital One continues to report its cardholders' “high credit” amounts but not their credit limits.FN1


FN1. Retailers National Bank, a previous defendant in this litigation, appears recently to have begun reporting its customers' credit limits in addition to their “high credit” amounts. (Doc. # 137 at 9:6-7; id. at Ex. M-1 at 11 (Target NB entry of credit report).)


Aside from this complaint, Baker brings other claims against Capital One and claims against Equifax, virtually all of which arise under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 to 1681u. Her claims predominantly are for allegedly negligent misreporting, including the misreporting of information related to Baker's 1996 bankruptcy, as well as for allegedly negligent failures to follow statutorily prescribed procedures. The provision governing civil liability for negligent violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act is located at 15 U.S.C. § 1681o. Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1332 (9th Cir.1995). That section provides in relevant part:

*2 § 1681o. Civil liability for negligent noncompliance

(a)In general

Any person who is negligent in failing to comply with any requirement imposed under this subchapter [15 U.S.C. § § 1681 to 1681u] with respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer in an amount equal to the sum of-

(1) any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure; and

(2) in the case of any successful action to enforce any liability under this section, the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney's fees as determined by the court.

Although Baker has also argued throughout this litigation that these and the other defendants willfully violated the law in order to ruin her credit score and the credit scores of millions of other Americans, she has provided no evidence to support a finding of willful violation against either Capital One or Equifax. See Reynolds, 435 F.3d at 1097-99 (defining “willfully” as it appears in the Fair Credit Reporting Act and discussing evidence that may be used to show willfulness or lack thereof). As regards Baker's claims for negligent violations, the court addresses Capital One's motion first and then the motion by Equifax.



II. Summary Judgment Standard

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment shall be entered if the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file show that there is no genuine dispute regarding the material facts of the case and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) (2004); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc ., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986) (citations omitted). The Court must evaluate a party's motion for summary judgment construing the alleged facts with all reasonable inferences favoring the nonmoving party. Baldwin v. Trailer Inns, Inc., 266 F.3d 1104, 1117 (9th Cir.2001).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the Court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U .S. 317, 323 (1986) (citations omitted). Where the moving party has met its initial burden with a properly supported motion, the party opposing the motion “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but ··· must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (citations omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate against a party who “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial .” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322; accord Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 26 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir.1994). Although the initial burden is on the movant to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, this burden may be discharged by indicating to the Court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's claims. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir.1995).



III. Capital One's Motion for Summary Judgment

*3 Baker's Second Amended Complaint (doc. # 4 (“Complaint”) alleges that she filed notices of dispute with credit reporting agencies about information Capital One had inaccurately reported to those agencies. ( See Compl. at ¶ 81.) According to Baker, when these notices were forwarded to Capital One, Capital One negligently failed to fulfill its obligations under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b). That section provides:

(b) Duties of furnishers of information upon notice of dispute

(1) In general

After receiving notice pursuant to section 1681i(a)(2) of this title of a dispute with regard to the completeness or accuracy of any information provided by a person to a consumer reporting agency, the person shall-

(A) conduct an investigation with respect to the disputed information;

(B) review all relevant information provided by the consumer reporting agency pursuant to section 1681i(a)(2) of this title;

(C) report the results of the investigation to the consumer reporting agency;

(D) if the investigation finds that the information is incomplete or inaccurate, report those results to all other consumer reporting agencies to which the person furnished the information and that compile and maintain files on consumers on a nationwide basis; and

(E) if an item of information disputed by a consumer is found to be inaccurate or incomplete or cannot be verified after any reinvestigation under paragraph (1), for purposes of reporting to a consumer reporting agency only, as appropriate, based on the results of the reinvestigation promptly-

(i) modify that item of information;

(ii) delete that item of information; or

(iii) permanently block the reporting of that item of information.

Baker argues that Capital One violated this section in responding to notices of dispute about four categories of reported information. (Compl. at ¶ 81(a)-(l).) First, Baker disputed Capital One's failure to report her credit limit. Second, in May and June of 2002, Baker disputed the date of Baker's bankruptcy as reported by Capital One. Third, in September of 2002, Baker disputed the current balance reported by Capital One; Capital One then corrected the current balance but did not correspondingly update her “high credit” amount, forcing her to submit a further dispute in October of 2002. Fourth, in response to Baker's dispute, Capital One changed the “high credit” amount to $0 for two of her accounts. The court addresses Baker's claims related to each of these disputes in turn.



A. Credit Limits

Baker argues that in response to her notice of dispute, Capital One violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681 s-2(b) by reporting only her “high credit” amount and not her credit limit. According to Baker, Capital One's failure to subsequently include her credit limit in its reports rendered those reports “incomplete” under § 1681s-2(b)(1)(D). The court, however, has already determined that 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) does not by its terms require creditors to report consumers' credit limits. (Doc. # 103 at 4-5 (order of 1/24/2006).) Granted, a creditors' choice not to report its customer's credit limits may negatively effect those customers' credit scores, if calculated using FICO methodology. But third party use of a possibly imperfect methodology in synthesizing consumer information for commercial use does not give rise to a legal duty, previously unrecognized, requiring creditors to cater their reporting to such third party's methodology. Baker has provided no authority for the proposition that creditors bear responsibility for assuring that FICO score generators render “accurate” results when inputted with otherwise accurate reported information. Rather, the legal duty of creditors to report information in response to disputes is governed by 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b), which includes no specific requirement that credit limits be reported by creditors who do not ordinarily do so. While other statutes, regulations or caselaw may or may not require the reporting of certain specific items of information such as credit limits, Baker has waived her rights under such authority by failing to present it here. See Arai v. Am. Bryce Ranches, Inc., 316 F.3d 1066, 1070 n.4 (9th Cir.2003). Capital One's motion for summary judgment on this claim is therefore granted.



B. Date of Bankruptcy Reported in May and June of 2002

*4 Baker next alleges that after receiving notification of her dispute, Capital One continued to misreport the date of her bankruptcy. Baker alleges that despite two such notifications, Capital One reported to the credit reporting agency Experian that one of her accounts (the “52910 account”) had been discharged in bankruptcy in April of 2001, when in fact the account had been discharged in 1996.

To establish a prima facie case of a Fair Credit Reporting Act violation, Baker must present evidence showing that the defendant reported inaccurate information. See Guimond, 45 F.3d at 1333 (setting forth requirements for prima facie case under analogous § 1681 e(b)). The defendant can thereafter avoid liability by showing that the inaccurate report was generated despite the defendant's following reasonable procedures or performing a reasonable investigation. See id.

Capital One's motion for summary judgment challenges this claim on three grounds. Capital One argues (1) that the evidence Baker submits does not suggest Capital One reported inaccurate information, because Baker is misinterpreting that evidence, (2) that Capital One satisfied its duty to perform a reasonable investigation following both the May and June disputes, and (3) that the statute of limitations bars any action based on the May dispute.



1. Baker's Evidence of Capital One's Inaccurate Reporting

Baker introduces as evidence of Capital One's inaccurate reporting a “correction summary” issued by Experian to Baker following Capital One's confirmation of the disputed information with Experian. (Doc. # 131 Ex. 3 at Ex. A at EXP0175.) To understand the related arguments, it is necessary to describe in some detail the appearance of this summary. For each of Baker's accounts, the summary has eight columns of information. The headings for six of the eight columns suggest that more than one type of information is contained in the column. For example, the second column's heading is “Date opened/ Reported since.” The date the account was opened readily could be different from the date the creditor began reporting about the account to Experian, and indeed, for Baker's 52910 account, the entry in this column reads “7-1994/ 6-1996,” i.e., the account was opened in July of 1994 and Capital One began reporting on this account to Experian in June of 1996. As another example, the fourth column's heading reads “Type/ Term/ Monthly payment,” and the entry in that column is “Revolving/ NA/ $0.”

The parties' dispute centers around the third column, which has the heading “Date of status/ Last reported.” The “status” that the “Date of status” apparently corresponds to is also noted: “Status: Included in bankruptcy/ Account charged off.” For Baker's Capital One accounts, the entry in the column with the heading “Date of status/ Last reported” is “4-2001 / 4-2001.” Baker argues that Experian is reporting the account as having been “included in bankruptcy” in April of 2001 (and also last reported in April of 2001), suggesting that Capital One is erroneously reporting the date of her 1996 bankruptcy to Experian. Her understanding, moreover, is buttressed by the entry in this column for another of Baker's accounts, also with “status” of “included in bankruptcy” but with the entry “7-1996/ 12-2000.” (Doc. # 131 Ex. 3 at Ex. A at EXP0176.) This other creditor, then, appears to have last reported in December of 2000 that Baker's bankruptcy was in July of 1996. For Baker, this indicates that Capital One performed a perfunctory investigation upon receiving notice of her dispute, did not correct the error, and continued to report an erroneous date to Experian.

*5 Capital One provides evidence purporting to unloose Baker from her confusion. The affidavit testimony of Kimberly Hughes, a Specialist in Consumer Affairs Special Services for Experian, is that “[t]he dates appearing in the ‘status' column of Experian's credit reports reflect the date of the status or the date the creditor last reported information about the account.” (Doc. # 131 Ex. 3 at Aff. at ¶ 5.) This testimony, of course, tells us nothing that the column heading, “Date of status/ Last reported,” did not already. Hughes also testifies that Experian “collects bankruptcy discharge information through public records and does not rely on furnishers of information to provide information about the date of a consumer's bankruptcy filing.” ( Id. at Ex. 3 at Aff. at ¶ 2.) But this testimony is also unhelpful, given that the information Experian independently gathers is listed in a separate section of its reports. ( Id. at Ex. 3 at Aff. at ¶ 3.) That Experian collects and reports information on bankruptcy in another section does not clarify whether, for accounts with status of “included in bankruptcy,” the “Date of status” field completed by the creditor should correspond with the date of the bankruptcy. See Cahlin v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 936 F.2d 1151, 1156-57 (11th Cir.1991) (describing the “accuracy defense” under analogous § 1681e(b)). In light of Baker's evidence, Capital One has failed to show as a matter of law that it accurately reported Baker's information.



2. Reasonable Investigation

Where a plaintiff has shown evidence tending to show inaccurate reporting, the defendant may “escape liability” by showing that the “inaccurate report was generated despite ··· following reasonable procedures.” Guimond, 45 F.3d at 1333 (discussing procedures under § 1681 e(b) for allegedly unreasonable investigations by reporting agencies). The reasonableness of the defendant's investigation is typically a jury question. Id.

Here, Capital One provides evidence that it conducted a reasonable investigation of Baker's disputes and verified everything mentioned in the notifications. (Doc. # 131 Ex. 1 at Aff. at ¶¶ 7, 10.) Baker provides neither argument nor evidence to the contrary, except to surmise that Capital One's investigation must have been unreasonable because it continued to report as it had. Although Capital One would have the burden of proof on this issue at trial, summary judgment in such circumstances is appropriate. See U.S. for Use & Benefit of Hawaiian Rock Products Corp. v. A.E. Lopez Enters., 74 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir.1996) (affirming summary judgment for plaintiff where no dispute of fact existed on any of the four elements of the plaintiff's claims); Flying Diamond Corp. v. Pennaluna & Co., 586 F.2d 707, 713 & n.3 (9th Cir .1978) (affirming summary judgment on negligence claim where the “case was in effect a trial on a stipulated record. There is nothing to weigh, there is no credibility involved” (citations and internal quotations omitted)); Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635, 643 (9th Cir.1969) (“One against whom a motion for summary judgment is filed is therefore under a duty to show that he can produce evidence at the trial, and is not entitled to a denial of that motion upon the unsubstantiated hope that he can produce such evidence at trial.” (citations omitted)). The court nevertheless addresses Capital One's statute of limitations argument in the interest of thoroughness.



3. Statute of Limitations for the May Dispute

*6 An action to enforce any liability created under the Fair Credit Reporting Act is to be brought no later than “2 years after the date of discovery by the plaintiff of the violation that is the basis for such liability.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681p(1). Baker filed this action on June 9, 2004. (Doc. # 1.) Baker was informed of the results of Capital One's investigation by mail sent on or about May 31, 2002. (Doc. # 131 Ex. 4 at ¶ 9.) Baker, however, asserts that she retreives her mail only “about once a month” and submits evidence that she did not receive the relevant mail until June 18, 2002. (Doc. # 137 at 9:20-22; doc. # 138 at ¶ 22.) Summary judgment on this ground therefore is denied.



C. “High Balance” Reported in September and October of 2002

Finally, Baker's Complaint alleges that in September of 2002, she disputed the balance on another of her Capital One accounts (the “5187 account”). She did so, she argues, not because her balance was incorrect, but because the “high credit” amount listed was incorrect and there was no option to dispute the “high credit” amount. (Doc. # 137 at 5:18-22.) In response, Capital One updated the balance only, without altering the “high credit” amount. (Doc. # 122 at 10: 10-16.)

In October, however, Baker disputed the “high credit” amount on the account, despite her assertion that she was previously unable to do so. ( Id. at 10:17-25; doc. # 131 at ¶ 23; doc. # 139 at ¶ 23.) Baker does not contest Capital One's assertion that her “high credit” amount then was corrected.

In light of Baker's concession that Capital One corrected all erroneous information brought to its attention, summary judgment is appropriate. Section 1681s-2(b)(1)(A) obligates creditors that receive notice of a dispute to conduct an investigation “with respect to the disputed information.” In both the September and October investigations, Capital One conducted an investigation of the information disputed and corrected it.



D. “High Credit” Amount Changed to $0

Baker's Complaint alleges that in response to her disputes, on January 24, 2003, Capital One changed the “high credit” amount for two of her accounts to $0. The evidence Baker presents in support of this claim is at best incomprehensible and in any event does not show that Capital One changed her “high credit” amount to zero. (Doc. # 137 Ex. N-1.) Baker has therefore failed to fulfill her duty as the non-movant on summary judgment to present evidence showing that Capital One reported inaccurate information.

In conclusion, summary judgment is appropriate on all of Baker's claims. Capital One's objections to Baker's evidence are therefore moot.



III. Equifax's Motion for Summary Judgment

Equifax moves for summary judgment on each of Baker's nine claims, located at ¶¶ 113-121 of Baker's Complaint. The court addresses Equifax's motion with respect to each claim.



A. Reasonable Procedures Under 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b)

*7 Paragraph 113 of Baker's Complaint alleges that Equifax failed to follow reasonable procedures to assure the accuracy of the information about Baker that it reported. Section 1681e(b) of Title 15, U.S.C., provides:

(b) Accuracy of report

Whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates.

“In order to make out a prima facie violation under § 1681 e(b), a consumer must present evidence tending to show that a credit reporting agency prepared a report containing inaccurate information .” Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir.1995) (citing Cahlin v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 936 F.2d 1151, 1156 (11th Cir.1991)).FN2 Thereafter, “an agency can escape liability if it establishes that an inaccurate report was generated depite the agency's following reasonable procedures.” Id.


FN2. Equifax's submission about the requisite showing for a prima facie case under Guimond misstates that authority. ( See doc. # 125 at 5:19-26.)


Baker does not refute Equifax's argument that none of the documents she relies upon is a “consumer report” as required under § 1681 e(b). (See Doc. # 125 at 5:27-6:13); Thomas v. Gulf Coast Credit Servs., Inc., 214 F.Supp.2d 1228, 1233 (M.D.Ala.2002) (holding that “the volumes of credit information Defedants relayed to Plaintiff do not constitute ‘consumer reports' under the FCRA.” (citations omitted)). As a more general matter, Baker cites no evidence of any individual instance of inaccurate reporting by Equifax so as to make out a prima facie case. Where the moving party has met its initial burden with a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the party opposing the motion “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (citations omitted). Instead of disputing or even acknowledging Equifax's arguments about Baker's evidence in support of her prima facie case, Baker merely reiterates, without citing evidence, that Equifax's reporting was inaccurate and that its procedures were unsatisfactory. (Doc. # 145 at 3-4.) Baker's previous, wholesale incorporation of her one-hundred-one paragraph statement of facts into her brief ( id. at 3:11-13), cannot suffice to carry her burden as the non-moving party on summary judgment. The court will not undertake the role of advocate to review the entirety of Baker's evidence in search of what could be helpful in defending those elements of her claim challenged by Equifax. See Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1029-31 (9th Cir.2001).



B. Incomplete Disclosures Under 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1) and A.R.S. § 44-1522

In Paragraph 114 of her Complaint, Baker alleges that Equifax failed to provide complete consumer disclosures in violation of 15 U .S.C. § 1681g(a)(1) and A.R.S. § 44-1522. The court addresses Baker's claims under these two statutes in turn.



1. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1)

*8 With exceptions, 15 U.S.C. § 1681(g)(a) provides that “[e]very consumer reporting agency shall, upon request ··· clearly and accurately disclose to the consumer ··· [a]ll information in the consumer's file at the time of request.” “The term ‘file,’ when used in connection with information on any consumer, means all of the information on that consumer recorded and retained by a consumer reporting agency regardless of how the information is stored.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(g).

Baker fails to raise a triable issue as to whether Equifax fully disclosed all information on file in response to Baker's requests. Equifax, for its part, presents evidence that it provided Baker all the information in her file each time she requested it. (Doc. # 133 Ex. A at ¶¶ 13, 26.) Baker's evidence that for some accounts Equifax retains up to 22 fields of data (doc. # 146 Ex. P-18 at EIS0092) does not contradict Equifax's evidence that it retained no undisclosed data about her accounts. Moreover, Baker's apparent attempt to compare the quantity of information reported about her in different Equifax publications, such as a trimerged report comparing Equifax, Experian, and Trans Union credit reports ( id. at P-17), does not show that the sole “consumer disclosure” form Baker relies upon was in any way incomplete. ( Id. at Ex. P-9.) The motion for summary judgment on Baker's claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1681 g(a)(1) is therefore granted.



2. A.R.S. § 44-1522

Section 44-1522(A), A.R.S., provides:

The act, use or employment by any person of any deception, deceptive act or practice, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or concealment, suppression or omission of any material fact with intent that others rely upon such concealment, suppression or omission, in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise whether or not any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby, is declared to be an unlawful practice.

Baker presents no evidence that Equifax deceived her in any transaction in which she purchased merchandise or that Equifax acted with intent to conceal information. The motion for summary judgment on Baker's claim under A.R. S. § 44-1522 is therefore granted.



C. Improper Sale of Data to Resellers that Provide Incomplete Disclosures and Overcharge for Resale of the Data

In Paragraph 115 of her Complaint, Baker alleges that Equifax sold credit data to resellers of that data engaging in illegal practices. Baker's brief provides no authority for Equifax's liability on such facts. The motion for summary judgment on this claim is therefore granted.



D. Summary of All Rights Under 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(c)(2)

Baker alleges in Paragraph 116 of her Complaint that Equifax failed to provide her a summary of all rights in violation of 15 U.S .C. § 1681 g(c)(2). However, in her brief, Baker concedes that Equifax sent a summary of rights with each disclosure. (Doc. # 145 at 5:27-28.) Baker again alleges that Equifax is vicariously liable under the Fair Credit Reporting Act for noncompliance by resellers of the data with whom Equifax does business but provides no authority for that proposition. ( Id. at 6:2-4.) The motion for summary judgment on this claim is therefore granted.



E. Provision of Trained Personnel Under 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(c)

*9 In Paragraph 117 of her Complaint, Baker alleges that Equifax failed to provide trained personnel in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(c). That section provides:

(c) Trained personnel

Any consumer reporting agency shall provide trained personnel to explain to the consumer any information furnished to him pursuant to section 1681g of this title.

In her brief, Baker submits evidence that Equifax makes available trained personnel for 60 days after the consumer obtains an Equifax credit report. (Doc. # 146 Ex. R-8.) Baker's argument, then, must be that 15 U.S.C. § 1681 h(c) requires Equifax to make available trained personnel for a longer period of time. Given that the statute expressly ties the obligation to make personnel available to the furnishing of information under section 1681 g, the court will not read section 1681h(c) to require availability in perpetuity, at least where Baker has provided no authority on the issue. The court therefore grants the motion for summary judgment on this claim.



F. Consideration of Baker's Information Under 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(4)

Paragraph 118 of the Complaint alleges that, when provided notice of erroneous information in Baker's credit report, Equifax failed to consider Baker's submitted information in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(4). That provision states:

(4) Consideration of consumer information.-In conducting any reinvestigation ··· with respect to disputed information in the file of any consumer, the consumer reporting agency shall review and consider all relevant information submitted by the consumer in the period described in paragraph (1)(A) with respect to such disputed information.

Equifax submits evidence that for each dispute remitted by Baker, it conducted a full reinvestigation and reviewed all information submitted. (Doc. # 133 Ex. A at ¶¶ 12, 21-22.) Where the moving party has met its initial burden with a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the party opposing the motion “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (citations omitted). In response to Equifax's motion, Baker makes no comprehensible argument for liability under this section. (Doc. # 145 at 6-9.) Baker's general allegations of erroneous reporting contain no isolated, specific facts upon which to premise liability under § 1681i(a)(4). Specifically, Baker's brief neither details nor cites information provided to Equifax that was allegedly ignored. The motion is therefore granted.



G. Notice by Fax or Email Under 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(6)

In Paragraph 119 of Baker's Complaint, she alleges that Equifax failed to provide written notices by fax or email instead of by mail, as she requested. Baker alleges that Equifax is liable under 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(6), which provides:

(6) Notice of results of reinvestigations.-

(A) In general.-A consumer reporting agency shall provide written notice to a consumer of the results of a reinvestigation under this subsection not later than 5 business days after the completion of the reinvestigation, by mail or, if authorized by the consumer for that purpose, by other means available to the agency.

*10 Baker argues that her mailbox is miles from her home and that Equifax utilizes mail delivery in order to subject Baker to identity theft. However, § 1681i(a)(6) merely authorizes, and does not require, consumer reporting agencies to deliver notices “by other means” than mail. Baker presents no authority suggesting Equifax was required to utilize email or fax at Baker's request. The motion for summary judgment on this claim is therefore granted.



H. Descriptions of Reinvestigation Procedures Under 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(7)

Paragraph 120 of Baker's Complaint alleges that Equifax failed to provide descriptions of its reinvestigation procedures in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(7), which provides:

(7) Description of reinvestigation procedure.-A consumer reporting agency shall provide to a consumer a description referred to in paragraph (6)(B)(iii) by not later than 15 days after receiving a request from the consumer for that description.

The “description” that must be provided by the consumer reporting agency is “a description of the procedure used to determine the accuracy and completeness of the information ··· including the business name and address of any furnisher of information contacted in connection with such information and the telephone number of such furnisher, if reasonably available.” 15 U .S.C. § 1681i(6)(B)(iii).

Baker provides no evidence that Equifax failed to provide an adequate description of its procedures upon Baker's request. In her brief, Baker cites generally to her Exhibit P, which is a thick stack of papers containing 20 separate documents. The only specific citation with regard to this claim is to Exhibit P-12. (Doc. # 145 at 9.) It is impossible to determine what information in Exhibit P-12 is referred to or whether the document even supports Baker's assertion. No evidence is cited indicating which, if any, of these documents were received in response to a request for a description by Baker under § 1681i(a)(7), or even whether Baker ever made such a request. The motion for summary judgment is therefore granted.



I. Misrepresentation of CreditWatch Program Under A.R.S. § 44-1522

Paragraph 121 of Baker's Complaint alleges that Equifax misrepresented its CreditWatch program in violation of A.R. S. § 44-1522. Baker argues that having purchased “CreditWatch consumer disclosures,” they were never delivered. (Doc. # 145 at 10:1-2.) Equifax provides evidence that it did not sell the CreditWatch program to Baker and that CreditWatch is sold by a separate entity named Equifax Consumer Services, Inc. (Doc. # 133 Ex. A at ¶ 27.)

Baker in effect argues that the court should hold Equifax liable for the actions of Equifax Consumer Services, Inc. No authority is provided in support of that course of action. The motion for summary judgment is therefore granted.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Capital One's Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. # 122) is granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Equifax's Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. # 125) is granted.

*11 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the clerk enter judgment in favor Defendant Capital One Bank and Defendant Equifax Information Services, L.L.C., and that Plaintiff Christine Baker take nothing on her complaint. The clerk shall terminate this action.
_________________
David Szwak
Chairman, Consumer Protection Section, Louisiana State Bar Association
Bodenheimer, Jones & Szwak, LLC
416 Travis Street, Suite 1404
Mid South Tower
Shreveport, Louisiana 71101
318-424-1400
Fax 318-221-6555

[Administrator]

Baker v. Fair Isaac and Co.
Slip Copy, 2006 WL 1371624
D.Ariz.,2006.
May 16, 2006

Christine Baker, Meadview, AZ, pro se.
Brian Joseph Palmer, Jared G. Parker, Rodrick Joseph Coffey, Stinson Morrison Hecker LLP, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendants.


ORDER


ROBERT C. BROOMFIELD, District Judge.


I. Introduction

*1 On February 14, 2006, Defendant Verizon Wireless (“Verizon”) filed a motion for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff Christine Baker's (“Baker”) claims against it. Mot. (doc. 237). Thereafter, on March 15, 2006, Baker filed a motion requesting leave to file a First Amended Complaint. Mot. for Leave (doc. 248). These motions were both fully briefed on April 5, 2006. P. Reply (doc. 266).FN1 This Court, having carefully considered all the arguments presented by the parties, now rules.


FN1. Oral argument is requested by at least one of the parties on each of these motions. Finding oral argument unnecessary, the Court shall deny such requests.




II. Background Facts

On March 19, 2003, Baker brought various claims against twenty-seven defendants, including Verizon. Complt. (doc. 1). When Baker initially filed her Complaint, it was unclear exactly what claims she was asserting against Verizon. D. Resp. (doc. 257) at 2. Accordingly, Verizon served Baker with Interrogatories in which it asked Baker to list each cause of action she was asserting against Verizon. Id. at 2-3. In response, Baker stated that “Verizon committed fraud and attempted to extort monies NOT owed[.]” Exbt. A (doc. 257) at 1. Based on this response, Verizon filed a motion for summary judgment on the “fraud” and “extortion” claims. D. Resp. (doc. 257) at 3. Verizon's motion primarily asserts that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Baker's fraud and “extortion” claims; and, even if the Court had jurisdiction, Verizon would nevertheless be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Mot. (doc. 237).

About a month after Verizon filed its motion for summary judgment, Baker filed a motion requesting leave to file an amended complaint. Mot. for Leave (doc. 248). Baker seeks to amend her Complaint by removing the parties that have already been dismissed from this lawsuit, and adding new claims against Defendants Experian and ConsumerInfo.com. Id. at 1-2. In addition, Baker seeks to add claims against Verizon for negligence and gross negligence, and claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). Id. at 2, 10.

···



III. Discussion



A. Baker's Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint

Rule 15 states that leave shall be freely given to amend a complaint when justice so requires. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15. A plaintiff should be granted the freedom to amend their complaint unless the opposing party can show prejudice, bad faith, or undue delay. Forman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). However, if the plaintiff's amendments would be futile, the court may, in its discretion, deny the Motion to Amend. Nunes v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 805, 808 (9th Cir.2004).

Here, Verizon asserts that Baker's motion to amend should be denied. D. Resp. (doc. 257). At the outset, Verizon argues that Baker's proposed amendments against it are futile. Id. at 4-9. First, Verizon asserts that it cannot be held liable under the FDCPA because (1) it is not a “debt collector” as defined by the statute; and (2) the relevant letters used as the basis for Baker's claim were sent by third-parties. Id. at 4-5. Second, Verizon argues that Baker lacks standing to assert claims under the FDCPA, because the relevant letters used as the basis for her claim were not addressed to her; thus, she is not a “consumer” as defined by the statute. Id. at 5-6. Third, Verizon maintains that Baker's claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 6. Fourth, Verizon argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Baker's “negligence” claims, because Baker is seeking only $25,000 in damages. D. Resp. (doc. 257) at 6-7. Fifth, Verizon contends that Baker's “negligence” claims fail to state a claim. Id. at 7-9.

*2 In addition, Verizon argues that Baker's motion for leave to amend her complaint should be denied, because her undue delay prejudices Verizon and the motion is made in bad faith. Id. at 9-12. Lastly, Verizon asserts that the Court should deny Baker's motion, because it fails to comply with Local Rule 15(C). Id. at 12-13.

Baker fails to respond to any of Verizon's arguments, except for the allegations that her motion was made in bad faith and failed to comply with Local Rule 15(C). P. Reply (doc. 266). In explanation of her failure to respond to Verizon's other arguments, Baker states,

··· [m]ost of Verizon's 14 page filing would be more appropriate in a motion to dismiss and Plaintiff will not argue her claims in this Reply. Verizon is free to file a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment after the First Amended Complaint has been filed, giving Plaintiff sufficient time to respond appropriately.

P. Reply (doc. 266) at 3. The Court finds Baker's postponement of her response to Verizon's arguments regarding futility and undue delay to be detrimental to her motion.

Baker's motion to amend is filed three years after she filed her original Complaint. Her request comes after Verizon filed its motion for summary judgment and after discovery began between the parties. However, Baker's motion and proposed First Amended Complaint contain no newly discovered information or argument that explains such a delay. The Ninth Circuit has noted that “a district court does not ‘abuse its discretion in denying a motion to amend a complaint ··· when the movant presented no new facts but only ‘new theories' and ‘provided no satisfactory explanation for his failure to fully develop his contentions originally.’ “ Nunes, 375 F.3d at 808.

Moreover, in the absence of any counter argument by Baker, the Court finds Verizon's contentions concerning the futility of Baker's proposed additional claims to be convincing. “Futility alone can justify the denial of a motion for leave to amend.” Id. Thus, the Court shall deny Baker's motion to amend in regard to her additional proposed claims against Verizon.



B. Verizon's Motion for Summary Judgment



1. Standard of Review

To grant summary judgment, the court must determine that the record before it contains “no genuine issue as to any material fact” and, thus, “that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In determining whether to grant summary judgment, the court will view the facts and inferences from these facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A material fact is any factual dispute that might affect the outcome of the case under the governing substantive law. Id. at 248. A factual dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the dispute in favor of the nonmoving party. Id.

*3 A party opposing a motion for summary judgment cannot rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings or papers, but instead must set forth specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. See id. at 250. Finally, if the nonmoving party's evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, a court may grant summary judgment. See, e.g., California Architectural Build. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir.1987).



2. Analysis

Verizon argues that summary judgment should be granted in its favor on all of Baker's claims against Verison. Mot. (doc. 237) at 1-2. First, Verizon asserts that, because Baker failed to timely respond to its requests for admission, she automatically admits numerous statements that indicate that she was not wronged or damaged by Verizon. Id. at 2-5. Second, Verizon asserts that, under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Baker's claims. Id. at 5. Specifically, Verizon notes that Baker admitted in her answers to its interrogatories that she is only seeking to recover compensatory damages in the amount of $25,000; thus, failing to reach the requisite amount of over $75,000. Id. at 5-6. Additionally, Verizon notes that Baker has failed to raise any claims that would give rise to federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Id. at 6-7. Third, Verizon asserts that Baker has failed to state a valid fraud claim, as she has not alleged sufficient facts to satisfy the elements of such a claim. Mot. (doc. 237) 7-9. Fourth, Verizon contends that Baker's “extortion” claim is not a cognizable claim, as Baker fails to cite any federal or state authority as a source for her claim. Id. at 9. Verizon notes that Arizona does not recognize a common law civil cause of action for extortion, nor does a statute exist. Id. at 10. Fifth, Verizon asserts that the damages for “mental anguish” and “loss of income” that Baker seeks are not recoverable in fraud. Id. at 10-11. Finally, Verizon requests an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending this claim. Id. at 12.

In her response, Baker fails to respond to any of Verizon's arguments, except for the issues regarding her admissions and Verizon's request for fees. P. Resp. (doc. 251). Although Baker admits that her responses to Verizon's request for admissions were filed one day after the deadline, she requests that the Court allow her to withdraw the admissions. Id. at 1, 2-3. In any event, Baker makes no arguments in opposition to Verizon's assertions concerning the viability of Baker's fraud and “extortion” claims, and the Court's jurisdiction over them. Instead, Baker argues that the Court retains jurisdiction over the “FDCPA claims” that she added in her proposed First Amended Complaint. Id. at 6-7.

A party opposing a motion for summary judgment cannot rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings or papers, but instead must set forth specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. If the nonmoving party's evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, a court may grant summary judgment. See, e.g., California Architectural Build. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir.1987). Thus, the Court shall grant Verizon's motion for summary judgment on Baker's fraud and “extortion” claims. However, the Court shall deny the motion in regard to Verizon's request for attorney's fees, as the request was not properly filed in accordance with Local Rule 54.2.

*4 Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that Baker's motion requesting leave to file a First Amended Complaint (doc. 248) is DENIED in regard to her additional proposed claims against Verizon.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Verizon's motion for summary judgment (doc. 237) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. It is denied as to Verizon's request for attorney's fees but granted in all other respects.
_________________
David Szwak
Chairman, Consumer Protection Section, Louisiana State Bar Association
Bodenheimer, Jones & Szwak, LLC
416 Travis Street, Suite 1404
Mid South Tower
Shreveport, Louisiana 71101
318-424-1400
Fax 318-221-6555

[Administrator]

Baker v. Capital One Bank
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2006 WL 173668
D.Ariz.,2006.
January 24, 2006

Christine Baker, Meadview, AZ, pro se.
Rodrick Joseph Coffey, Stinson Morrison Hecker LLP, Heidi McNeil Staudenmaier, Jennifer Hadley Dioguardi, Snell & Wilmer LLP, Kathleen Ann Biesterveld, Kevin Duffy Quigley, Quarles & Brady Streich Lang LLP, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendants.


ORDER


WAKE, J.
*1 The court has considered Defendant Retailers National Bank's Motion For Summary Judgment (doc. # 63) (“Motion”), Statement Of Facts In Support Of Defendant Retailers National Bank's Motion For Summary Judgment (doc. # 64) (“Retailers SOF” and “Retailers SOF Ex.”), Notice Of Errata Filed By Defendant Retailers National Bank (doc. # 66), Plaintiff's Response And Memorandum Opposing The Retailers National Bank Motion For Summary Judgment (docs. # 68 or # 69) (“Response”), Affidavit Of Plaintiff Christine Baker In Support Of Her Objection To The Retailers National Bank Motion For Summary Judgment (doc. # 70), Plaintiff's Response To The Retailers National Bank Statement Of Facts (doc. # 71), Reply Supporting Defendant Retailers National Bank's Motion For Summary Judgment (doc. # 79) (“Reply”), and Retailers National Bank's Objection To Exhibits ··· Plaintiff's Affidavit ··· And Response To Retailers National Bank Statement Of Facts (doc. # 81) (“Objection”). The court has also considered Plaintiff's Response To Retailer National Bank's Objection To Her Exhibits, Affidavit And Response To The Statement Of Facts In Support Of Her Opposition To Its Motion For Summary Judgment (doc. # 95).

Plaintiff Christine Baker (“Baker”) brought this action against various defendants alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act with regard to her personal credit reports and her creditors' reporting practices. Defendant Retailers National Bank (“Retailers”), a creditor of Baker and reporter of credit information about Baker to credit reporting agencies, now moves for summary judgment on Baker's claims that Retailers violated various provisions of those acts.



I. Background

Retailers issued two credit cards to Baker, a Target store card and a Mervyn's credit card. (Motion at 2.) Retailers routinely submits information related to Baker's accounts to credit reporting agencies on an automated basis. (Retailers SOF at ¶ 2.) On November 6, 2002, and February 10, 2003, Retailers received notices from credit reporting agencies that Baker had disputed information reported by Retailers to such agencies. (Retailers SOF at ¶¶ 9, 11.) The parties dispute whether Retailers conducted a reasonable investigation of those disputes and whether Retailers submitted accurate corrective information to the credit reporting agencies in response to the notices.

Baker contends that Retailers' failure to report Baker's credit limit leads credit reporting agencies to report her “high credit” amount, which is the highest amount of credit ever utilized, as her credit limit, a practice that has the effect of reducing her credit score. (Response at 4.) Retailers submits that although it has no legal duty to report customers' credit limit, it does report its customers credit limit along with all other pertinent information in its reports to credit reporting agencies. (Retailers SOF at ¶ 8.)



II. Legal Standard For Summary Judgment

*2 Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment shall be entered if the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file show that there is no genuine dispute regarding the material facts of the case and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) (2004); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The Court must evaluate a party's motion for summary judgment construing the alleged facts with all reasonable inferences favoring the nonmoving party. See Baldwin v. Trailer Inns, Inc., 266 F.3d 1104, 1117 (9th Cir.2001).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the Court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Where the moving party has met its initial burden with a properly supported motion, the party opposing the motion “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but ··· must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Summary judgment is appropriate against a party who “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Id. at 322. See also Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 26 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir.1994). Although the initial burden is on the movant to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, this burden may be discharged by indicating to the Court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's claims. See Singletary v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 193 n. 2 (3d Cir.2001).



III. Reporting Credit Limits In Response To Notification Of Dispute From A Credit Reporting Agency Under The Fair Credit Reporting Act

Baker alleged in her Complaint that Retailers violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act by failing to report Baker's credit limit to credit reporting agencies after being informed by those agencies that Baker had disputed information reported by Retailers. The Fair Credit Reporting Act as codified in 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1) states:

(b) Duties of furnishers of information upon notice of dispute

(1) In general

After receiving notice pursuant to section 1681i(a)(2) of this title of a dispute with regard to the completeness or accuracy of any information provided by a person to a consumer reporting agency, the person shall-

(A) conduct an investigation with respect to the disputed information;

(B) review all relevant information provided by the consumer reporting agency pursuant to section 1681i(a)(2) of this title;

*3 (C) report the results of the investigation to the consumer reporting agency; and

(D) if the investigation finds that the information is incomplete or inaccurate, report those results to all other consumer reporting agencies to which the person furnished the information and that compile and maintain files on consumers on a nationwide basis.

(Emphasis added). Focusing on the “completeness” language of § 1681s-2(b)(1)(D), Baker argues that Retailers' failure to report Baker's credit limit-in addition to all other pertinent information-to consumer reporting agencies after receiving notice of Baker's dispute was a violation of this section.

Baker has not provided authority for the assertion that 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1) requires creditors to include in their reports consumers' credit limits in order for the creditors' reports to be “complete.” “Completeness” as required by § 1681s-2(b)(1) must have boundaries; the determination of what is “complete” must be made with reference to some objective standard of what is generally required in creditors' reports to reporting agencies. Baker has provided no authority and the court has found none suggesting that the statute would generally require credit limits to form a part of such reports. On the contrary, a negative inference is permissible. The statute expressly provides that creditors must report specific other information to consumer reporting agencies yet does not so mandate with respect to a consumer's credit limit. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(1)(3)-(5). Retailers also urges a negative inference from a January 18, 2000 press release by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, which referenced the practice of some financial institutions that do not report credit limits but made no suggestion that such omissions were unlawful. (Retailers SOF at Ex. D.) In light of the foregoing, Baker's bare assertion that the report needed to include her credit limit in order to be “complete” is unsupported. Retailers is therefore entitled to summary judgment on this issue.



IV. The Adverse Action Letter Requirement Under The Fair Credit Reporting Act And The Equal Credit Opportunity Act



A. The Fair Credit Reporting Act

Baker argues that Retailers did not comply with the adverse action letter requirement of the Fair Credit Reporting Act in 15 U.S .C. § 1681m(a), which states in relevant part:

(a) Duties of users taking adverse actions on the basis of information contained in consumer reports

If any person takes any adverse action with respect to any consumer that is based in whole or in part on any information contained in a consumer report, the person shall-

(1) provide oral, written, or electronic notice of the adverse action to the consumer;

(2) provide to the consumer orally, in writing, or electronically-

(A) the name, address, and telephone number of the consumer reporting agency (including a toll-free telephone number established by the agency if the agency compiles and maintains files on consumers on a nationwide basis) that furnished the report to the person····

*4 Baker argues that Retailers violated this provision in two ways. First, Baker argues that Retailers should have sent Baker an adverse action letter when Retailers reduced her Mervyn's account credit limit due to inactivity. Second, Baker argues that Retailers should have sent Baker an adverse action letter when Retailers thereafter reinstated her credit limit, at her request, to $300 as opposed to her requested level of $400. Retailers has withdrawn its motion for summary judgment with respect to this latter incident. (Reply at 6.)

The issue before the court, therefore, is whether the definition of “adverse action” in § 1681m(a) includes a reduction in a credit limit based on account inactivity. The definition of “adverse action” applicable in “Subchapter III-Credit Reporting Agencies,” in which § 1681(m)(a) is found, is located in 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(k). That section states that “The term ‘adverse action’ ··· has the same meaning as in section 1691(d)(6) of this title.” The definition in § 1691(d)(6) is elaborated in 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(c), which states in relevant part:

(c) Adverse action.

(1) The term means:

···

(2) The term does not include:

···

(ii) Any action or forbearance relating to an account taken in connection with inactivity, default, or delinquency as to that account.

Thus, reduction in a consumer's credit limit based on account inactivity is not an “adverse action” and does not trigger the “adverse action” letter duty in 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a). Since Baker does not dispute that Retailers' reduction of Baker's credit limit was taken due to account inactivity, the court grants Retailers' motion.



B. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act

The regulations referenced above were passed pursuant to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 et. seq., which requires similar disclosures upon such “adverse actions.” Because the Equal Credit Opportunity Act uses the same definition of “adverse action” as the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the court also grants Retailers' motion with respect to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act for Retailers' failure to provide an adverse action letter based on its reduction of Baker's credit line for account inactivity. As with Baker's claim under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, Retailers has withdrawn its motion for summary judgment related to Retailers' reinstatement of a lower credit limit than that requested by Baker. (Reply at 6.)



V. Reasonable Investigation Under The Fair Credit Reporting Act

Baker alleged in her Complaint that Retailers wilfully and negligently failed to conduct a reasonable investigation of Baker's disputes, in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b). As discussed above, that section requires creditors who have received notice of a consumer's dispute to “conduct an investigation with respect to the disputed information.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(A). Case law interpreting the section requires that such an investigation be “reasonable.” Johnson v. M.B.N.A. Amer. Bank, 357 F.3d 426, 431 (4th Cir.2004).

*5 Retailers moves for summary judgment arguing that it reasonably investigated and corrected the consumer disputes of which it was apprised. Although Baker makes passing references to the issue in her Response to Retailers' Statement Of Fact (doc. # 71 at ¶¶ 9-14), Baker does not openly oppose Retailers' motion on this issue in her brief.

Baker submits evidence that Retailers confirmed incorrect information with the credit reporting agencies, ( see doc. # 71 at ¶¶ 9-14; doc. # 70 at ¶¶ 2-3), apparently to show the unreasonableness of Retailers' investigations by reference to Retailers' actions after those investigations. Specifically, Baker's affidavit suggests that on two occasions-on November 3, 2002, and sometime in February-she disputed her Target store card credit limit and that Retailers confirmed its reporting of $157 as opposed to her true credit limit of $200. (doc. # 70 at ¶¶ 2, 3.) Baker alleges that $ 157 was her “High Balance,” inaccurately reported as her credit limit. ( Id.)

Retailers presents evidence that Baker only registered two complaints, one on November 6, 2002 and one on February 10, 2003. (DSOF Ex. B at ¶¶ 3, 5, 7.) The first complaint, according to Retailers, dealt with erroneously reported lated payments and did not relate to Baker's credit limit. ( Id. at ¶ 3.) In response to Baker's second complaint, which Retailers acknowledges related to Baker's credit limit, Retailers argues that it corrected the reporting error. (DSOF Ex. B at ¶¶ 5-6.) Despite Baker's allegations to the contrary, even Baker's evidence suggests that Retailers corrected her report following the second complaint. ( See doc. # 68 or # 69 at Ex. K-6 (correctly reporting the “High Balance” as $157 and the “Credit Limit/ Original Amount” as $200 and noting that “This item was verified on Feb 2003 and remained unchanged.”).)

Baker's evidence is not probative of the reasonableness of Retailers' investigation. The credit reports and Baker's affidavit tend to show only that after investigating Baker's complaints, Retailers declined to alter the information it was reporting. ( See PSOF Ex. K-1 (“RNB-Target remains” (emphasis added)); K-3 (“Target verified the information it was reporting.”); K-4 (RNB-Target remains” (emphasis added)); K-5 (showing reporting of $157 limit).) Nevertheless, Retailers has objected to Baker's evidence.



A. Evidentiary Issues

“It is well settled that only admissible evidence may be considered by the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Beyene v. Coleman Sec. Servs., 854 F.2d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir.1988). Baker's evidence consists of various exhibits and an affidavit. (Response at “Exhibits K” at K-1 through K-8; doc. # 68 or # 69.) The exhibits appear predominantly to be portions of Baker's personal credit reports or responses to inquiries made of credit reporting agencies, and the affidavit relates information obtained by Baker from credit reporting agencies while investigating the claims underlying her Complaint. ( See doc. # s 68 or # 69, 70 .) Retailers first objects to Baker's exhibits on the ground that they are unauthenticated.

*6 Baker's exhibits are properly authenticated. “The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Fed.R.Evid. 901(a). Testimony of a witness with knowledge that a matter is what it is claimed to be satifies this requirement. Fed.R.Evid. 901(b)(1). Baker submits an affidavit stating that “All my exhibits are true copies of documents received from the [Credit Reporting Agencies].” (doc. # 70 at ¶ 8.) Baker's affidavit testimony satisfies the requirement of authentication for these exhibits to be admitted as reports received from credit reporting agencies.

Retailers next objects to Baker's exhibits and affidavit on the ground that they are hearsay. Hearsay is an out-of-court assertion offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Fed.R.Evid. 801(c); Beyene, 854 F.2d at 1182.

Baker offers her exhibits into evidence for the truth of statements made in them. For example, Exhibit K-2-apparently part of an Experian credit report-states with respect to Baker's Target account that “This item was verified on 11-2002 and remained un[changed].” (Response at Exh. K-2 at 1.) Baker submits this document as proof that Retailers verified $157 as Baker's credit limit instead of $200. (doc. # 70 at ¶ 2). Exhibit K-2 is thus offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted in it, and is hearsay. See Capital Funding v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS 2212, no. 01-6093, *6 (E.D.Pa. Feb. 11, 2005) (affirming exclusion of credit reports as hearsay).

Exhibits K-1 and K-3 through K-5 are similarly introduced for the purpose of proving that Retailers verified reported amounts, which is the matter asserted in statements in those documents. ( See doc. # 68 or # 69 at K-1, K-3, K-4, K-5; doc. # 70 at ¶¶ 2-3; doc. # 71 at ¶¶ 10, 12.) These exhibits are therefore also hearsay.

Some of Baker's affidavit testimony, moreover, is hearsay. For example, Baker's affidavit testimony relates conversations she had with employees of credit reporting agencies and is offered in order to prove the things stated by those employees during the conversations. ( See doc. # 70 at ¶¶ 2-3.)

Baker lays no foundation to qualify any of this evidence for an exception to the hearsay rule. Arguably, for instance, the credit reports fall within the business records exception of Fed.R.Evid. 803(6). However:

A writing is admissible under this exception only if two foundational facts are proved: (1) the writing is made or transmitted by a person with knowledge at or near the time of the incident recorded, and (2) the record is kept in the course of regularly conducted business activity. These facts must be proved through the testimony of the custodian of the records or other qualified witness, though not necessarily the declarant.

Beyene, 854 F.2d at 1183 n. 4 (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotations omitted). As a mere consumer, Baker cannot testify to the truth of these necessary foundational facts. As stated by the Capital Funding court, which found the business records exception inapplicable under very similar circumstances, “[Plaintiff] has not provided sufficient evidence that [the authenticating witness] has personal knowledge of the record keeping practice of [the credit reporting agency], a company [the authenticating witness] is neither employed by nor affiliated with, other than as a consumer. Accordingly, the Court did not error in excluding the credit reports.” Capital Funding, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *7. The court therefore does not look to Baker's hearsay evidence in deciding Retailers' motion for summary judgment. Beyene, 854 F.2d at 1182 (holding that because defendant had not properly laid a foundation for any exception to the hearsay rule, defendant's hearsay evidence was properly ignored on motion for summary judgment).

*7 The court granted Baker's request for additional time to respond to Retailer's evidentiary objections in the event that the court denied Baker's motion to strike those objections. ( See doc. # 93 .) Baker's supplemental submission does not correct the evidentiary insufficiencies. ( See doc. # 95.) Exhibits 1-5 and paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of Baker's affidavit are therefore inadmissible to the extent they rely on or constitute inadmissible hearsay.



B. Effect Of Inadmissible Evidence On Baker's Reasonable Investigation Claim

Because Baker has submitted no admissible evidence contradicting Retailers' evidence related to the reasonableness of its investigations, no reasonable jury could find that Retailers' investigation and resolution of the disputes was unreasonable, even if the jury did not believe Retailers' witnesses. Canada v. Blain's Helicopters, Inc., 831 F.2d 920, (9th Cir.1987) ( “Discredited testimony is not a sufficient basis for drawing an affirmative contrary conclusion.” (citations omitted)). The court therefore grants Retailers' motion.



VI. Allegation Of Impermissible Credit Report Solicitation

Baker's Complaint suggests that Retailers' solicitation of Baker's credit report, when deciding whether to reinstate her Mervyn's credit line to its previous amount, was improper. (Complaint at ¶ 85.) The Fair Credit Reporting Act does not, however, impose liability on users of consumer credit information. Frederick v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 911 F.2d 1, 2 (7th Cir.1990). Because Baker has not opposed Retailers' motion on this issue and has provided no other rationale for imposing liability based on Retailers' solicitation of a credit report, the court grants Retailers' motion.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Retailers' motion for summary judgment (doc. # 63) is granted.
_________________
David Szwak
Chairman, Consumer Protection Section, Louisiana State Bar Association
Bodenheimer, Jones & Szwak, LLC
416 Travis Street, Suite 1404
Mid South Tower
Shreveport, Louisiana 71101
318-424-1400
Fax 318-221-6555

[Administrator]

One of our web site visitors emailed me a link [forum.creditcourt.com/discus/messages/803/4-3-06-Responses-to-Experian-Interrogatories-pub-7078.pdf ] to a very interesting set of discovery responses not only published by Christine Baker but actually placed on the internet by her. Read on....she obviously has a serious loose screw in her head. Threatening to blow up a company and people in it.

Initially you might laugh at some of her remarks but consider that the federal judge is not laughing at her and she makes all consumers appear as loose cannons when people like this harass the court. There is little doubt why she has been propelled from the courthouse repeatedly. Her bizarre antics do not help the rest of us.

=============
Christine Baker
HC 37 Box 2126
Meadview, AZ 86444
Tel: (206) 202-4653
Fax: (571) 222-1000
christine@bayhouse.com
In Pro Per

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Christine Baker;Plaintiff, v. Fair, Isaac & Company, et al;Defendants. )))))))))))))))CIV-03-0525-PCT-RCB

PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT EXPERIAN INFORMATIONSOLUTIONS FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES

INTERROGATORY NO. 1:
Identify Plaintiff, including Plaintiff’s full name, any nicknames or other names, including maiden name or aliases, Social Security numbers, and every residential addressPlaintiff has had for the past seven years.

RESPONSE:
Objection, relevance, overbroad and burdensome, compound.

INTERROGATORY NO. 2:
Identify all Persons having knowledge of any of the facts, occurrences, and matters setforth in Complaint and describe generally the substance of the knowledge by each such person.

RESPONSE:
Objection, overbroad and burdensome, compound. I requested this information fromExperian in my Interrogatory No. 2 and Experian chose not to answer. Obviously, Experian knows who reported the incorrect and incomplete data. Without waiving anyobjection, please see the Capital One and Target initial disclosure and discoveryresponses, docs 17, 47, 48 on the CD provided with my First Supplemental InitialDisclosures.

INTERROGATORY NO. 3:
Identify each item of information on any of Plaintiff’s Credit Reports and Plaintiff’sCredit Disclosures that Plaintiff contends is inaccurate or incomplete, and each item, statethe nature of the inaccuracy or incompleteness, including those items that Plaintiffcontends are attributable to the credit history of a person other than Plaintiff.

RESPONSE:
Objection, overbroad and burdensome, relevance, compound. Experian reported THOUSANDS of items incomplete or incorrect. It would probably take weeks to go through each report and list EVERYTHING that’s incorrect or incomplete and it would be a complete waste of my time because despite my numerous specific disputes, Experian choses to continue to report incorrect and incomplete data.Experian has more resources than I have and it is certainly welcome to compile alisting of all the OBVIOUSLY incorrect and incomplete data. However, I suspect thatExperian has no “trained personnel” able to compile such a listing and if so, I herebyoffer to train an Experian employee so that Experian can compile a listing of allincomplete and incorrect data. Without waiving objections, Experian reported the fraudulent American Agenciescollection, added false derogatory data to the Union Bank account, failed to report thecredit limits for my Target Guest Card account and the Capital One credit cards, reported the Capital One and Providian discharged account as delinquent, then continuallychanged the status dates for the Capital One and Providian discharged accounts to arecent date, reported incorrect and recent bankruptcy dates for a number of discharged accounts, incorrectly reported a judgment with Compass Bank as plaintiff when in fact I was the plaintiff, etc. etc. etc. Please read my Complaint for relevant specifics and thedisputes I have sent to Experian. The current issues e-mailed to Scott Kirkner, Jones Day, on 3/17/06:1 ) The judgment:I was the plaintiff and it was previously investigated, but still lists Compass Bank asplaintiff. 2) Capital One account 51780XXXXThe correct limit is $7,000 3) Capital One account 52914XXXXLists a recent payment of $0. That's incorrect because I make payments every month. 4) Juniper Bank 51402XXXXAlso reports $0 for recent payment. 5) Target 43523 XXXXAlso reports $0 for recent payment. Additionally there's this FALSE statement:Your statement:Account information disputed by consumer (Meets requirement of the Fair CreditReporting Act)This account is NOT disputed.6) Target account 92266858.... Your statement:Account information disputed by consumer (Meets requirement of the Fair CreditReporting Act)This account is NOT disputed. I need to know how these Target disputes statements impact on my credit. What isreported to creditors? What is the effect on FICO scores?8) Regarding the recent $0 payments when I actually made payments, how does thisimpact on my credit? Is this reported to creditors? I don't see it on my FICO report. If you think I should submit supplemental discovery requests, please let me know.Thanks, Christine

INTERROGATORY NO. 4:
Describe all notices, whether oral or in writing, made by Plaintiff of Plaintiff’srepresentative to Experian in which Plaintiff disputed the accuracy or completeness ofPlaintiff’s Credit Report or Plaintiff’s Credit Disclosure, including the date of such notification.

RESPONSE:
Objection, overbroad and burdensome, compound. I had expected Experian to provide me with a complete listing of all my calls and correspondence. Unfortunately, Experian chose not to provide any meaningful responses or documents and call records inits responses to my discovery requests or with its initial discosures.Does Experian not keep records? Did it destroy all records after I sued? Is itintentionally withholding these records? I hope to find out. Without waiving any objections, I supplied relevant documents with my 3/31/06 Supplemental Initial Disclosures:1. 1-2-02-fax-to-Carla-Blair5. 1-15-03--fax-to-Experian-Providian-CapOne-Target8. 1-18-02-fax-to-Carla-Blair13. 2-11-02-fax-to-Carla-Blair14. 2-13-02-fax-to-Carla-Blair19. 2-28-04-letter-Experian-JonesDay23. 5-5-02-fax-to-Carla-Blair34. 5-28-03-certified-dispute-Experian-Cap-One-limits43. 9-3-02-fax-to-Experian-reinvestigation-procedures50. 11-3-02-fax-to-Experian-reinvestigation-procedures. 11-05-email-re-Fraudulent-Fraud-Alert53. 11-6-03-letter-to-Experian-JonesDay-AmAg 55. 11-8-01-fax-to-Carla-Blair57. 11-11-03-fax-to-Experian-JonesDay-CIC59. 12-22-02-fax-to-Experian-reinvestigation-procedures61. 12-25-02-fax-to-Experian-dispute-judgmentExperian correspondence posted at the blog, see the attached file 4-3-06-blog-postings-Experian-#.pdf:p. 20 - 2/12/05 request to Experian to terminate the Dana Capital and NCOp. 43 - 2/11/04 Experian refusal to provide my reportp. 46 - 1/23/04 Experian refusal to provide my reportp. 49 - 8/27/03 Experian refusal to accept my callp. 50 - 8/26/03 Experian refusal to accept my disputep. 58 - my letter to Experian / Jones Day re. CIC7/28/02 Experian online disputes:Capital One M/C: Other reason Additional Information: Please add credit LIMITKmart Cap One: Other reason Additional Information: Please add credit LIMITFCNB M/C: Other reason Additional Information: High balance BELOW 5,000 and recent balance 09/1/02 Experian online disputes:Cap One and Providian discharged accounts:"Other reason Additional Information:Incorrect account history, discharged 5/96"Both were refused:"We have already investigated this information, and the creditor has verified that itis correct. If you still have a question about it, you may want to contact thecreditor, or if you have additional relevant information, click here."
Both accounts were verified in 6/02 11/3/02: Experian online disputes1) Capital One 52910XXXXXXOther reason Additional Information:Please delete: 'Discharged Through BK Ch 7, 11, or 12 04/30/2001 to 09/30/2002'"We have already investigated this information, and the creditor has verified that itis correct. If you still have a question about it, you may want to contact thecreditor, or if you have additional relevant information, click here."2) Providian 442800041600.... :Other reason Additional Information:That's incorrect: 'Discharged Through BK Ch 7, 11, or 12 07/31/1996 to 07/31/2002'"We have already investigated this information, and the creditor has verified that itis correct. If you still have a question about it, you may want to contact thecreditor, or if you have additional relevant information, click here."3) Capital One 52914XXXXXXOther reason Additional Information:Please add the credit limit of $7,500 "We have already investigated this information, and the creditor has verified that itis correct. If you still have a question about it, you may want to contact thecreditor, or if you have additional relevant information, click here."4) Capital One FSB 518720 XXXXXXOther reason Additional Information:Please add the credit limit of $6,000 "We have already investigated this information, and the creditor has verified that itis correct. If you still have a question about it, you may want to contact the creditor, or if you have additional relevant information, click here."5) RNB - TargetOther reason Additional Information:Please correct the credit limit to $200 Dispute accepted. 1/12/03: online dispute judgment, Providian 4/15/03: online dispute Nelnet lates9/18/03: Experian refused my online disputes11/4/05 Experian online dispute:Confirm the information below before continuing. I am disputing the CAPITAL ONE FSB credit item because:Other reason I have added this additional information:Please report the correct $7,000 credit limit. This is not a complete listing, I’m a consumer, not a business with an obligation to keep records. I certainly hope that Experian will provide a COMPLETE record of mydisputes.

INTERROGATORY NO. 5
Identify each procedure employed by Experian which did not assure the maximumaccuracy of the information in your consumer reports.

RESPONSE:
As evidenced by the Experian response to my Interrogatory No. 6, Experian employs absolutely NO procedures to assure the maximum possible accuracy of theinformation in my and as well as all other consumers’ reports. I also confirmed through my research and client work that Experian is not limiting its efforts to destroy MY credit and FICO scores, Experian strives to implement procedures to produce the most incomplete and inaccurate consumer reports, requiring consumers to continually purchase Experian reports and monitoring services. A few Experian procedures to assure maximum inaccuracy of consumerreports:1) Ignoring consumer disputes. 2) Refusing factual disputes claiming that they are frivolous. 3) Refusing telephone disputes unless the consumer has the Experian reportnumber and requiring the PURCHASE of a consumer report from Experian. 4) Refusing consumer disputes as previously investigates. 5) Refusing to provide consumer disclosures after Experian is sued to discourageconsumer litigation. 6) Providing INCOMPLETE consumer disclosures. 7) Refusing to correct or add accurate information as requested in consumerdisputes. 8) Continually CHANGING the reporting of derogatory accounts to maximizedamages to FICO scores. 9) Selling entirely fraudulent credit scores such as the CreditXpert and Eperian PLUS scores no lender uses. FYI, my Experian PLUS score was over 730 when my FICO scores was 648. 10) Most important, the investigations are handled by employees with no training whatsoever and apparently an IQ below 60. 11) Experian does not require that furnishers provide accurate and complete data12) Experian employs NO computerized error checking for OBVIOUSLYincorrect or incomple data. The consumers’ losses are Experian’s gains.Not only does Experian profit from the sales of incomplete reports to consumers, but sales to creditors also increase as the consumers’ credit rating is lowered. Subprimeborrowers are the cash cows. I’m sorry to say that I simply don’t have the time to submit a 100+ page paper on the shortcomings of the Experian procedures to assure complete and accurate reports, butmy disputes, this litigation and the dismal results, my blog postings and recent 648 Experian FICO score speak for themselves. If Experian should be interested in implementing procedures to assure completeand accurate reports, I’ll be happy to consult with qualified Experian personnel. No charge!

INTERROGATORY NO. 6:
Identify every instance in which Experian failed to comply with thereinvestigation requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1681i in response to a consumer disputeinitiated by you.

RESPONSE:
Objection, I cannot provide a complete listing until Experian provides the listingof calls, correspondence, online disputes and investigations. In addition to the specificallegations in my Complaint:At all times relevant to my claims, furnishers reported my credit data to Experian and it profited from the sale of my credit reports. It is therefore liable for its affiliateCredit Data SouthWest (“MIS”) failures to comply with reinvestigation requirements, especially since Experian refused my disputes while at the same time selling my reports. 1) The Union Bank fictitious “past due” notationOn 8/8/01 I disputed that I closed the account and not Union Bank. On 9/10/01 MIS inserted the derogatory and entirely fictitious “past due” notation. On 10/5/01 I disputed the derogatory “past due” notation. [MIS Exhibit 7]MIS failed to relay my dispute of the “past due” notation to Union Bank Experian continued to falsely report that the account was past due in 8/01. 2) The refusal to investigate the American Agencies fraudulent collection twiceOn 10/5/01 I disputed the American Agencies collection On 12/10/01 I disputed the American Agencies collection again, directly with Experian:MIS refused my factual disputes as “frivolous” and the entirely fraudulentcollection remained on my Experian report. 3) 7/28/02: Experian failed to correct the credit limits for the Capital One accounts. 4) 9/1/02 Experian refused to investigate the incorrect account history for the Providian and Cap One discharged accounts.
11/3/02: Experian refused to investigate the Providian and Cap One discharged accounts and the 2 Capital One open accounts. It accepted the Target dispute, butfailed to correct the credit limit.6) 1/12/03: Experian failed to correct the judgment7) 6/3/03: Experian failed to report the correct limits for the Capital One accounts and failed to consider the enclosed documentation. 8) 6/03: Experian was served with my Complaint, yet it failed to correct my report. Experian continued to report the Capital One and Target accounts without the creditlimits and the judgment continued to state that Compass Bank was the plaintiff.9) 9/18/03: Experian REFUSED to investigate the dispute of the judgment and the 2Capital One open accounts. 10) 2/28/04: Letter to Courtney Vaudreuil, Jones Day re. credit limitsNo corrections or any investigation results were received. 11) 11/5/05: Experian failed to correct the credit limits for the Capital One accounts.12) 3/17/06: My dispute to Scott Kirkner, Jones DayI have yet to receive any results. And, please consider this another dispute of the CapitalOne credit limits and the judgment. And then there were the many times when Experian prevented me from submitting online disputes and it refused to accept my disputes by telephone, apparently to retaliatebecause I filed this suit13) Experian failed to provide the reinvestigation procedures requested on numerousoccasions including 9/3/02, 11/3/02, 12/22/02.I will provide a more complete listing once Experian provided its records in response to my discovery requests.

INTERROGATORY NO. 7
Identify every credit report concerning you which was issued by Experian without apermissible purpose as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b.

RESPONSE:
NCO FINANCIAL SYSTEMSAddress:507 PRUDENTIAL RDHORSHAM PA 19044No phone number availableDate of Request:12/06/2004 .HSBC AUTOAddress:6602 CONVOY CTSAN DIEGO CA 92111 (800) 418-1888 Date of Request:09/30/2005 CRAWFORD COMMUNITY CREDIAddress:PO BOX 727 GALION OH 44833 No phone number availableDate of Request:09/02/2005 CITIFINANCIALAddress:300 SAINT PAUL PLBALTIMORE MD 21202 No phone number availableDate of Request:05/25/2005 CBMKTG-FIGIS INCAddress:3200 S MAPLE AVEMARSHFIELD WI 54449 No phone number availableDate of Request:09/20/2004
APPLIED CARD BANKAddress:800 DELAWARE AVEWILMINGTON DE 19801 No phone number availableDate of Request:05/04/2005 NORTH AMERICAN ACCEPTANCAddress:125 E BANKER ST STE 135 COSTA MESA CA 92626 No phone number availableDate of Request:04/05/2005 PREMIER BANKCARD INCAddress:900 W DELAWARE STSIOUX FALLS SD 57104 Date of Request:07/06/2004, 01/15/2004 INTERSECTIONS INCAddress:14901 BOGLE DR STE 300 CHANTILLY VA 20151 No phone number availableDate of Request:04/08/2004 MDA CAPITAL INCAddress:6036 CENTRAL AVESAINT PETERSBURG FL 33707 Date of Request:08/29/2003
PREMIER BANKCARD INCAddress:900 W DELAWARE STSIOUX FALLS SD 57104 Date of Request:01/15/2004 CB&TAddress:PO BOX 723896 ATLANTA GA 31139 Date of Request:10/29/2004, 10/19/2004 CB&TAddress:Date of Request:10/19/2004 DIRECT MERCHANT CO BKAddress:16430 N SCOTTSDALE RDSCOTTSDALE AZ 85254 (480) 375-4688 Date of Request:01/07/2005 CROSS COUNTRY BANKAddress:800 DELAWARE AVEWILMINGTON DE 19801 Date of Request:05/04/2005
EXPERIANAddress:PO BOX 2002 ALLEN TX 75013Date of Request:10/26/2005, 01/02/2002, 05/08/2001 ORCHARD BANKAddress:9400 SW BEAVERTON HILLSDBEAVERTON OR 97005 Date of Request:07/09/2002, 06/19/2002, 02/24/2002, 01/16/2002 GE FINANCIAL ASSURANCEAddress:6620 W BROAD STRICHMOND VA 23230 Date of Request:07/16/2002 PREMIER BANKCARD INCAddress:900 W DELAWARE STSIOUX FALLS SD 57104 Date of Request:10/22/2002, 01/10/2002 PREMIER BANKCARD INCAddress:900 W DELAWARE STSIOUX FALLS SD 57104 Date of Request:01/10/2002, 08/31/2001, 03/30/2001, 11/14/2000 CBT ASPIREAddress:PO BOX 723896 ATLANTA GA 31139Date of Request:10/25/2002, 09/23/2002, 08/29/2002, 02/26/2002 HBSBNA MCAddress:Date of Request:
5/14/2003 HOUSEHOLD BANKAddress:PO BOX 98700 LAS VEGAS NV 89193 Date of Request:10/23/2001 CHASE MORTGAGEAddress:800 RIDGEVIEW DRHORSHAM PA 19044 Date of Request:03/21/2003, 01/22/2003, 11/27/2002, 10/07/2002, 06/20/2002 PACIFIC COAST FUNDINGAddress:8311 HAVEN AVE STE 210 RANCHO CUCAMONGA CA 91730 Date of Request:05/31/2001 CROSS COUNTRY BANKAddress:800 DELAWARE AVEWILMINGTON DE 19801 Date of Request:08/13/2001, 02/27/2001 WELLS FARGO BANKAddress:18700 NW WALKER RD STE 9 BEAVERTON OR 97006 Date of Request:07/23/2001, 07/19/2001, 07/19/2001, 07/11/2001, 07/06/2001, 02/28/2001, 02/28/2001
WELLS FARGO BANKAddress:Date of Request:07/06/2001 AMERICAN AGENCIESAddress:2158 W 190TH STTORRANCE CA 90504 Date of Request:02/11/2002, 02/01/2002 AMERICAN AGENCIESAddress:Date of Request:02/01/2002 HBSBNA MCAddress:PO BOX 98700 LAS VEGAS NV 89193 Date of Request:05/14/2003, 10/23/2001

INTERROGATORY NO. 8
Identify every instance in which Experian failed to make a disclosure as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681g.

RESPONSE:
Objection, overbroad and burdensome. Without waiving any objections, everyExperian report is incomplete and does not contain the purpose of the inquiries. Additional, Experian failed to provide the date of first permanent delinquency. Experian failed to provide a summary of all rights with the reports. Resold reports are even more incomplete and sold at excessive costs. I purchased 4 extremely incomplete reports from ConsumerInfo.com and I purchased subscriptionsfrom TrueCredit and Trilegiant. I estimate that I ordered over 50 resold incompletereports.

INTERROGATORY NO. 9:
Describe all actual damages (including any loss of employment of opportunity and/oremployment) suffered by Plaintiff as a result of the alleged actions by Experian, including the nature of each item of damage, the amount of each item of damage, the date… bla bla bla

RESPONSE:
Objection, overbroad and burdensome. I don’t have 3 weeks to add up all the expensesrelated to my disputes and litigation, I will hire someone to do this once I have thejudgment and my damages are obviously continuing to accrue. Without waiving anyobjections and in addition to my Initial Disclosures:1) Recently I declined an offer of employment for $100/hr for ten hours prepaid because I was busy with litigation. I have wasted literally THOUSANDS of hourson this litigation and on dispute after dispute without ever getting the credit Ideserve. 2) Last week I looked at a lot to build a home with an asking price of $18,000. Afew years ago, this same lot had an asking price of $3,500. 3) The cost of housing and construction has substantially increased and so haveinterest rates. 4) My latest Experian FICO score was at an all-time low of 648 and I will need aconstruction loan to build. Good going, Experian!

INTERROGATORY NO. 10:
Describe all humiliation, embarrassment, defamation, and mental or emotional distress orsimilar type injury suffered by Plaintiff as a result of Experian’s actions, including allmanifestations of such mental states and any medical treatment received as a resultthereof, and all facts which form the basis of Plaintiff’s contention that Experian’s acts oromissions proximately caused the injury.

RESPONSE:
Objection, overbroad and burdensome, compound. I don’t have time to write the book right now. Without waiving any objections, let me assure you that I’m so angry and stressed right now that I’d like to blow Experian and their attorneys into millions of tinylittle pieces. You’re all very lucky that I am a pacifist. You’ll also be pleased to read that I’m starting to have problems with my eyes, blurryvision, frequent eye infections, “floaters” due to premature aging, especially when I havedeadlines such as for these discovery requests and I work 16 hour days. I’m 47 years oldand these are problems commonly experienced by people over 60. Experian might just get real lucky and I’ll have a heart attack or get breast cancer from allthe stress (like my mother and her cousin and her aunt) before Experian has to pay up.

INTERROGATORY NO. 11:
Identify all persons, including all medical professionals, having knowledge of Plaintiff’shumiliation, embarrassment and mental or emotional distress or similar type of injury ofwhich Plaintiff complains.

RESPONSE:
I hate your guts! How would I pay a “medical professional” and when do you think I’d have time to see one? Not to mention that I have no intention of going on happy pills.Of course that’s good for you too, remember the Prozac murders?

INTERROGATORY NO. 12:
State the basis for the punitive damages, including treble damages, sought againstExperian in the Complaint.

RESPONSE:
Experian willfully and maliciously employed and continues to employ procedures to destroy my credit. After 4 years of litigation, my Experian FICO score is lower than everbecause Experian continues to report incorrect and incomplete credit data despite mymany disputes. Not to mention the refusals of disputes, the intentional disregard for thedocumentation I supplied and the obvious false reporting of the judgment.

INTERROGATORY NO. 13:
Identify every application for credit or insurance made by or on behalf of Plaintiff during the past seven years, including whether the application was granted or denied.

RESPONSE:
Objection, overbroad and burdensome, relevance, compound.

INTERROGATORY NO. 14:
For each denial of credit or insurance made by or on behalf of Plaintiff during the pastseven years, describe the denial, e.g. whether oral or written, and the reasons given forthe denial, and any dispute related to the denial, etc.

RESPONSE:
Objection, overbroad and burdensome, relevance, compound.

INTERROGATORY NO. 15:
For each application of credit or insurance granted to Plaintiff during the past seven years, describe the credit or insurance obtained, e.g. the creditor, insurer, accountnumber, amount, repayment terms, etc.

RESPONSE:
Objection, overbroad and burdensome, relevance, compound. Without waiving anyobjections, some statements and offers are included with my Supplemental InitialDisclosures.

INTERROGATORY NO. 16:
Describe Plaintiff’s work history, including Plaintiff’s present occupation and businessaddresses during the past seven years..

RESPONSE:
Objection, overbroad and burdensome, relevance, compound. Without waiving anyobjections, I *would* be a real estate investor if I could only get the credit I deserve and if the litigation didn’t take up so much time. I used to be a licensed California real estate broker and my real estate credentials are included with my Supplemental InitialDisclosures. Due to the CRAs’ and creditors’ horribly inaccurate and incomplete credit reporting, I became the nation’s only expert on credit reporting and FICO scoring who offers creditconsulting services to the general public and that’s how I’ve been paying the bills. Dueto the CRAs’ frequent refusals to correct all disputed reporting and especially due to thefrequent and continual addition of derogatory data once the reports were finally fairlyaccurate with acceptable FICO scores, it is the most frustrating and depressing work imaginable. However, working with clients motivates me to continue with mypublications and litigation on behalf of all consumers. See http://creditfactors.com/order-analysis.htm and my websites.

INTERROGATORY NO. 17:
Describe Plaintiff’s total income for each of the past seven years, including all sources ofthis income, and the amount of income from each source.

RESPONSE:
Objection, overbroad and burdensome, relevance, compound.

INTERROGATORY NO. 18:
Identify all other lawsuits and court proceedings in which the Plaintiff is or was a party, including for each suit the case number, bla bla bla ….

RESPONSE:
Objection, overbroad and burdensome, relevance, compound.

INTERROGATORY NO. 19:
If Plaintiff has had any contact with any type of credit counseling service or “creditclinic” during the past seven years, describe all such contacts, e.g., the date of such contact, bla bla bla …

RESPONSE:
Objection, overbroad and burdensome, relevance, compound.

INTERROGATORY NO. 20:
Describe any criminal record of Plaintiff, bla bla bla …

RESPONSE:
Objection, relevance, compound.

DATED this 3rd day of April, 2006.

Christine BakerPlaintiff Pro Per
_________________
David Szwak
Chairman, Consumer Protection Section, Louisiana State Bar Association
Bodenheimer, Jones & Szwak, LLC
416 Travis Street, Suite 1404
Mid South Tower
Shreveport, Louisiana 71101
318-424-1400
Fax 318-221-6555

[Administrator]

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DEPARTMENT OF REAL ESTATE
http://www2.dre.ca.gov/PublicASP/pplinfo.asp?License_id=01007950

The license information shown below represents public information taken from the Department of Real Estate's database at the time of your inquiry. It will not reflect pending changes which are being reviewed for subsequent database updating. Also, the license information provided includes formal administrative actions that have been taken against licensees pursuant to the Business and Professions Code and/or the Administrative Procedure Act. All of the information displayed is public information. Although the business and mailing addresses of real estate licensees are included, this information is not intended for mass mailing purposes.

License information taken from records of the Department of Real Estate on 12/25/2006 12:30:10 AM
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

License Type:
BROKER


Name:
Baker, Christine


Mailing Address:
145 LAKE DR
SAN BRUNO, CA 94066


License ID:
01007950


Expiration Date:
07/19/00


License Status:
EXPIRED


Original License Date:
07/20/92 (Unofficial -- taken from secondary records)


Former Name(s):
NO FORMER NAMES


Main Office:
NO CURRENT MAIN OFFICE ADDRESS ON FILE


DBA
Bay House Real Estate Consulting
ACTIVE FROM 12/05/1995 TO 07/20/2000


Golden Gate Funding
ACTIVE FROM 07/20/1992 TO 07/20/2000


NO CURRENT DBAS


Branches:
NO CURRENT BRANCHES


Affiliated Licensed Corporation(s):
01183968 - Officer
Expiration Date: 09/05/98
Bay Area Housing & Finance Center
EXPIRED AS OF 09/06/98


Comment:
NO DISCIPLINARY ACTION


NO OTHER PUBLIC COMMENTS


>>>> Public information request complete <<<<
_________________
David Szwak
Chairman, Consumer Protection Section, Louisiana State Bar Association
Bodenheimer, Jones & Szwak, LLC
416 Travis Street, Suite 1404
Mid South Tower
Shreveport, Louisiana 71101
318-424-1400
Fax 318-221-6555

[Administrator]

All Types Name Search Results
1 Total Party match for selection BAY HOUSE REAL for CALIFORNIA
Search Complete
Mon Dec 25 02:36:59 2006
Selections 1 through 1 (Page 1)

Download (1 pages $ 0.00)

Bankruptcy Cases

Name Court Case No. Filed Chapter
1 BAY HOUSE REAL ESTATE CONSULTING
canbke 96-32001 05/09/1996 CHAPTER 7
CHRISTINE B. BAKER

=============
96-32001 Christine B. Baker
Case type: bk Chapter: 7 Asset: No Vol: v Judge: Dennis Montali
Date filed: 05/09/1996 Date discharged: 11/02/1996
Date terminated: 11/19/1996 Date of last filing: 11/19/1996

Parties
Christine B. Baker
145 Lake Dr.
San Bruno, CA 94066
SSNs: xxx-xx-0888
Tax id: 943122356
Added: 05/09/1996
(Debtor) represented by John D. Raymond
Law Offices of John D. Raymond
P.O. Box 642535
San Francisco, CA 94164-2535
(415) 351-2265
bankruptcycenter@sbcglobal.net
Assigned: 05/24/96
LEAD ATTORNEY

Robert M. Damir
235 Montgomery St. #967
San Francisco, CA 94104
(415) 433-9400
Added: 05/09/1996
(Trustee)

=====
Debtor
Christine B. Baker
145 Lake Dr.
San Bruno, CA 94066
SSN: xxx-xx-0888
Tax id: 943122356
fdba
Bay Area Housing & Finance Center
fdba
Golden Gate Funding
fdba
Office Support Services
dba
Bay House Real Estate Consulting

=====

96-32001 Christine B. Baker
Case type: bk Chapter: 7 Asset: No Vol: v Judge: Dennis Montali
Date filed: 05/09/1996 Date discharged: 11/02/1996
Date terminated: 11/19/1996 Date of last filing: 11/19/1996

Creditors
ALD Communications
1660 S Amphlett Blvd Ste 330
San Mateo CA 94403 (cr)
Allan H Rosenthal
dba The Freelance Alternative
1255 Post Street Ste 625
San Francisco CA 94109 (cr)
American Express
P O Box 0001
Los Angeles CA 90096-0001 (cr)
Associates
P O Box 9370
Des Moines IA 50306-9370 (cr)
Associates Credit Card Services
P O Box 15688
Wilmington DE 19886-5688 (cr)
Associates National Bank
P O Box 15688
Wilmington DE 19886-5688 (cr)
AT and T Universal Card
P O Box 9999
Columbus GA 31997-0001 (cr)
Bayshore Corporate Center
1720 South Amphlett Blvd Ste 110
San Mateo CA 94402 (cr)
Capital One
P O Box 85617
Richmond VA 23276-0001 (cr)
Colonial National Bank
c o McNeily Rosenfeld and Rubenstein
5335 Wisconsin Ave NW
Chevy Chase Pavilion Ste 360
Washington DC 20015 (cr)
County of San Mateo
Attn Lee Buffington
Tax Collector
2200 Broadway
Redwood City CA 94063 (cr)
First Card
P O Box 2004
Elgin IL 60122-0001 (cr)
First Card
P O Box 5930
Carol Stream IL 60197-5930 (cr)
First Deposit National Bank
c o Law Offices of Sidney Berenstein
P O Box 9155
Pleasanton CA 94566 (cr)
First Nationwide
475 San Mateo Ave.
San Bruno CA 94066 (cr)
GE Records Card
P O Box 650479
Dallas TX 75265-0479 (cr)
Home Savings
Loan Servicing Center
P O Box 60020
City of Industry CA 91716 (cr)
Paul Baker
145 Lake Drive
San Bruno CA 94066 (cr)
U S Dept of Education
Litigation Unit No 249
50 United Nations Plaza
San Francisco CA 94109 (cr)
UNIPAC
Nebhelp No 370
Denver CO 80281-0370 (cr)
Wells Fargo Mastercard
P O Box 4051
Concord CA 94524-4051 (cr)
_________________
David Szwak
Chairman, Consumer Protection Section, Louisiana State Bar Association
Bodenheimer, Jones & Szwak, LLC
416 Travis Street, Suite 1404
Mid South Tower
Shreveport, Louisiana 71101
318-424-1400
Fax 318-221-6555

[Administrator]

For real laughs, compare the self-promoting BS at: http://www.bayhouse.com/ChristineBaker.shtml

Left out many details in the bio there.
_________________
David Szwak
Chairman, Consumer Protection Section, Louisiana State Bar Association
Bodenheimer, Jones & Szwak, LLC
416 Travis Street, Suite 1404
Mid South Tower
Shreveport, Louisiana 71101
318-424-1400
Fax 318-221-6555

[Administrator]

www.ripoffreport.com/reports/ripoff41965.htm

Category:
Corrupt Companies Submitted: 1/18/2003 1:45:03 PM
Modified: 4/1/2004 11:16:37 PM


Christine Baker is operating a website on how to fraud the credit card companies rip-off cottonwood Arizona *Consumer Comment ..Who's slandering who here?

Company
Christine Baker
Address:
989 So. Main St. A-150
cottonwood Arizona 89452
_________________
David Szwak
Chairman, Consumer Protection Section, Louisiana State Bar Association
Bodenheimer, Jones & Szwak, LLC
416 Travis Street, Suite 1404
Mid South Tower
Shreveport, Louisiana 71101
318-424-1400
Fax 318-221-6555

[Administrator]

To meet the definition of a "credit repair organization" under § 1679a, plaintiff must show that defendant 1) used any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails, in order to 2) sell, provide, or perform (or represent that it could do so); 3) in return for valuable consideration; 4) services or advice about services designed to improve a consumer's credit record, credit history, or credit rating. 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3)(A).
_________________
David Szwak
Chairman, Consumer Protection Section, Louisiana State Bar Association
Bodenheimer, Jones & Szwak, LLC
416 Travis Street, Suite 1404
Mid South Tower
Shreveport, Louisiana 71101
318-424-1400
Fax 318-221-6555

[Administrator]

Lawrence Taylor: Which brings me to my second point, kids. Don't do crack.


Quotes from The Waterboy [1998]
http://www.garnersclassics.com/qwater.htm
_________________
David Szwak
Chairman, Consumer Protection Section, Louisiana State Bar Association
Bodenheimer, Jones & Szwak, LLC
416 Travis Street, Suite 1404
Mid South Tower
Shreveport, Louisiana 71101
318-424-1400
Fax 318-221-6555

[Administrator]

Bobby Boucher: So that's what opening up a can of whoop-ass feels like.
Coach Klein: Son, you just opened up a whole case of whoop-ass.

Quotes from The Waterboy [1998]
www.imdb.com/title/tt0120484/quotes
_________________
David Szwak
Chairman, Consumer Protection Section, Louisiana State Bar Association
Bodenheimer, Jones & Szwak, LLC
416 Travis Street, Suite 1404
Mid South Tower
Shreveport, Louisiana 71101
318-424-1400
Fax 318-221-6555

[Administrator]

Coach Red Beaulieu: See this here? That's a national championship ring. Don't mess with the champ!

Quotes from The Waterboy [1998]
_________________
David Szwak
Chairman, Consumer Protection Section, Louisiana State Bar Association
Bodenheimer, Jones & Szwak, LLC
416 Travis Street, Suite 1404
Mid South Tower
Shreveport, Louisiana 71101
318-424-1400
Fax 318-221-6555

[Administrator]

www.bayhouse.com/cgi-bin/discus/board-profile.pl?action=display_profile&profile=admin-MODERATOR
_________________
David Szwak
Chairman, Consumer Protection Section, Louisiana State Bar Association
Bodenheimer, Jones & Szwak, LLC
416 Travis Street, Suite 1404
Mid South Tower
Shreveport, Louisiana 71101
318-424-1400
Fax 318-221-6555

[Administrator]

[img]http://bayhouse.com/cgi-bin/discus/board-profile.pl?action=display_picture&picture=admin-[/img]
_________________
David Szwak
Chairman, Consumer Protection Section, Louisiana State Bar Association
Bodenheimer, Jones & Szwak, LLC
416 Travis Street, Suite 1404
Mid South Tower
Shreveport, Louisiana 71101
318-424-1400
Fax 318-221-6555

[Administrator]

02/28/2007 330 Notice re Offer to dismiss with prejudice all claims against Experian and ConsumerInfo.com in exchange for removal from public access of all credit reports filed by Experian and CIC by Christine Baker re 329 Order on Motion for Reconsideration, (Baker, Christine) (Entered: 02/28/2007)

03/02/2007 331 Notice re Order Re: Offer To Dismiss All Claims Against Defendants by Experian Information Solutions, Inc., ConsumerInfo.com re 330 Other Notice, (Carlson, Marc) (Entered: 03/02/2007)

=======

Wow Christine. You are really knocking the bottom out of those bureaus and furnishers. I will bet you scare the bejebbers out of them when they see your lawsuits hit their desks. Then you have the audacity to criticize the world and all consumer lawyers for not taking YOUR "cases." It is time to turn off your little internet broadcasts from your abandoned school bus in the high desert. Good riddens.
_________________
David Szwak
Chairman, Consumer Protection Section, Louisiana State Bar Association
Bodenheimer, Jones & Szwak, LLC
416 Travis Street, Suite 1404
Mid South Tower
Shreveport, Louisiana 71101
318-424-1400
Fax 318-221-6555

[Administrator]

I see the Judge denied that goofy motion you filed.

02/27/2007 329 ORDERED denying 328 Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification. FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff Baker's response to the summary judgment motions previously filed by defendants Experian and CIC shall be filed on or before 5:00 p.m., March 19, 2007. FURTHER ORDERED that defendants Experian and CIC shall file a reply to plaintiff's response on or before 5:00 p.m., March 28, 2007. Signed by Judge Robert C Broomfield on 2/27/07. (RCB)(.pdf document is attached) (Entered: 02/27/2007)
_________________
David Szwak
Chairman, Consumer Protection Section, Louisiana State Bar Association
Bodenheimer, Jones & Szwak, LLC
416 Travis Street, Suite 1404
Mid South Tower
Shreveport, Louisiana 71101
318-424-1400
Fax 318-221-6555